

For Six Month Period Ending Nov. 30, 2006
(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant (b) Registration No.

Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC

5430

- (c) Business Address(es) of Registrant

1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW - Tenth Floor
Washington, DC 20004

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following:

- (a) If an individual:
- | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Residence address | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Citizenship | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Occupation | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
- (b) If an organization:
- | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Name | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Ownership or control | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Branch offices | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
- (c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in items (a) and (b) above.
N/A

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE DIVISION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4 AND 5(a).

3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date connection ended
N/A		

- (b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
N/A				

5. (a) Has any person named in item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, identify each such person and describe his service.

N/A

- (b) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or connection	Date terminated
Stephen J. Yates	Vice President, Barbour Griffith & Rogers International	September 15, 2006

- (c) During this 6 month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence address	Citizenship	Position	Date assumed
N/A				

6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(c) of the supplemental statement? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

N/A

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal

Date of termination

National Dialogue Party - Lebanon

September 30, 2006

Embassy of the State of Eritrea

June 30, 2006

8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal² during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and address of foreign principal

Date acquired

N/A

9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principals² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

Kurdish Democratic Party - Iraq
 Republic of China (Taiwan)
 State of Qatar, Embassy
 Republic of India, Embassy
 Serbia

10. EXHIBITS A AND B

(a) Have you filed for each of the newly acquired foreign principals in Item 8 the following:

Exhibit A³ Yes ☒ No ☐
 Exhibit B⁴ Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

(b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during the 6 month period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9).) A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form CRM-157 (Formerly OBD-67), sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form CRM-155 (Formerly OBD-65), sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

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11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

SEE ATTACHED

-
12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates and places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

SEE ATTACHED

-
13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits any or all of your foreign principals? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, describe fully.

N/A

⁵ The term "political activities" means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION

14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies⁶

Date	From whom	Purpose	Amount
SEE ATTACHED			

Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUND RAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fund raising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS - THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name of foreign principal	Date received	Description of thing of value	Purpose
N/A			

6, 7 A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, money, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fund raising campaign. (See Rule 201(e).)

8 An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fund raising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

9 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) DISBURSEMENTS - MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

(1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒(2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☒

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To whom	Purpose	Amount
SEE ATTACHED			

Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS – THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, and 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date disposed	Name of person to whom given	On behalf of what foreign principal	Description of thing of value	Purpose
N/A				

(c) DISBURSEMENTS – POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or thing of value	Name of political organization	Name of candidate
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^{10, 11} Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks" and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials ¹²?
 Yes ☒ No ☐

IF YES, RESPOND TO THE REMAINING ITEMS IN SECTION V.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

SERBIA

Government of India

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Radio or TV broadcasts | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Magazine or newspaper articles | <input type="checkbox"/> Motion picture films | <input type="checkbox"/> Letters or telegrams |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Advertising campaigns | <input type="checkbox"/> Press releases | <input type="checkbox"/> Pamphlets or other publications | <input type="checkbox"/> Lectures or speeches |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Internet | <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ | | |

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Public Officials | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Newspapers | <input type="checkbox"/> Libraries |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Legislators | <input type="checkbox"/> Editors | <input type="checkbox"/> Educational institutions |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Government agencies | <input type="checkbox"/> Civic groups or associations | <input type="checkbox"/> Nationality groups |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other (specify) _____ | | |

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- ☒ English ☐ Other (specify) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☒ No ☐


23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act? Yes ☒ No ☐

12 The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

VI – EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1746, the undersigned swear(s) or affirm(s) under penalty of perjury that he/she has (they have) read the information set forth in this registration statement and the attached exhibits and that he/she is (they are) familiar with the contents thereof and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her (their) knowledge and belief, except that the undersigned make(s) no representation as to the truth or accuracy of the information contained in the attached Short Form Registration Statement(s), if any, insofar as such information is not within his/her (their) personal knowledge.

(Date of signature)

18 Dec 06(Type or print name under each signature¹³)G. O. Griffith, Jr.

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¹³ This statement shall be signed by the individual agent, if the registrant is an individual or by a majority of those partners, officers, directors or persons performing similar functions, if the registrant is an organization, except that the organization can, by power of attorney, authorize one or more individuals to execute this statement on its behalf.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FARA REGISTRATION UNIT
National Security Division
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

NOTICE

Please answer the following questions and return this sheet in triplicate with your Supplemental Statement:

1. Is your answer to Item 16 of Section V (Informational Materials – page 8 of Form CRM-154, formerly Form OBD-64-Supplemental Statement):


YES X or NO _____

(If your answer to question 1 is "yes" do not answer question 2 of this form.)

2. Do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration:

YES _____ or NO _____

(If your answer to question 2 is "yes" please forward for our review copies of all material including: films, film catalogs, posters, brochures, press releases, etc. which you have disseminated during the past six months.)


Signature

18 Dec 06
Date

G.O. GRIFFITH, JR.
Please type or print name of
Signatory on the line above

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Title

CRM/RS/REGISTRATION
2007 DEC 17 11 09 34

*Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430*

Questions 11 & 12:

Preamble:

Kurdistan Democratic Party:

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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CRM/REGISTRATION UNIT

DATE OF CONTACT	U.S. GOVT. OFFICIAL CONTACTED	MANNER IN WHICH CONTACT WAS MADE	SUBJECT MATTER
June 16	Dan Fried, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
June 27	Robert Karem, Office of the Vice President	Office Meeting	KRG
June 28	Ambassador Ross Wilson, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
June 30	Michelle Sayders, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
July 5	Tom Warrick, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
August 9	Tom Warrick, Department of State	Office Meeting	KRG
August 9	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Doug Silliman and Andy Morrison, Department of State	Office Meeting	KRG
August 9	Jason Broder, State Department	Office Meeting	KRG
August 23	Doug Silliman, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
September 12	Phillip Zelikow, State Department	Office Meeting	KRG
September 21	Phillip Zelikow, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
September 27	Stephen Rademaker, Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Telephone Call	KRG
September 28	Brian Walsh, Senator Mel Martinez	Telephone Call	KRG
October 3	Doug Silliman, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
October 18	David Satterfield, State Department	Telephone Call	KRG
October 18	Reynolds Kiefer, National Security	Telephone Call	KRG

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	Council		
October 18	Puneet Talwar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	KRG
October 26	Meghan O'Sullivan, National Security Council	Meeting	KRG
October 31	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	KRG
December 1	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	KRG

Westerman, Stefanie

From: Westerman, Stefanie on behalf of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International
Sent: Tuesday, October 31, 2006 3:38 PM
Subject: Wall Street Journal: "The Weekend Interview: Massoud Barzani, Kurdistan"

Please find below Judith Miller's article "The Weekend Interview: Massoud Barzani, Kurdistan" published Saturday, October 28, 2006, in *The Wall Street Journal*. The link for the article can be found at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116198958692406549.html>

Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation and dissemination of information on behalf of the Kurdistan Regional Government. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

COMMENTARY: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW Massoud Barzani Kurdistan

By JUDITH MILLER
 October 28, 2006; Page A6

ERBIL, Iraq -- Unlike Baghdad, 200 miles away, the air here does not echo with the sound of gunfire, car bombs and helicopters. Residents of this city of a million people picnic by day in pristine new parks and sip tea with friends and relatives at night. American forces are not "occupiers" or the "enemy," but "liberators." Mentioning President Bush evokes smiles -- and not of derision.

American forces were "most welcome" when stationed here at the start of the invasion of Iraq, says Massoud Barzani, the president of Kurdistan in the north. Not a single U.S. soldier was killed in his region, he adds proudly, "not even in a traffic accident." Would U.S. forces be welcome back now? "Most certainly," he declared this week in an interview in his newly minted marble (and heavily chandeliered) palace. The more American soldiers the better, a top aide confirms.



The secret of Kurdistan's relative success so far -- and of America's enduring popularity here -- is the officially unacknowledged fact that the three provinces of the Kurdish north are already quasi-independent. On Oct. 11, Iraq's parliament approved a law that would allow the Sunni and Shiite provinces also to form semi-autonomous regions with the same powers that the constitution has confirmed in Kurdistan. And while Kurdish leaders pay lip-service to President Bush's stubborn insistence on the need for a unified Iraq with a strong centralized government, Kurdistan is staunchly resisting efforts to concentrate economic control in Baghdad.

The U.S., Mr. Barzani believes, should leave it to the Iraqis to decide if they want "one or two or three regions." Then, he adds: "But it already exists. The division is there as a practical matter. People are being killed on the basis of identity." As for Baghdad, "it should have a special status as the federal capital. But the rest should be regions that run their own affairs. Or they should be separate. Only a voluntary union can work. Either you have federalism with Baghdad as a federal capital with a special status, or you have separation. Those are the facts."

* * *

Even the most fleeting visitor cannot but notice that Kurdistan is almost a full-fledged state. The Kurds have been running their own affairs -- badly at times -- ever since Washington created a safe area after Saddam Hussein crushed their U.S.-encouraged uprising after the 1991 Gulf war, sending much of the traumatized population into the rugged mountains separating Kurdish Iraq from Turkey. After CNN filmed Kurds dying of cold and starvation, President George H.W. Bush declared a "no fly" zone north of the 36th parallel from which Saddam's planes were barred, enabling the Kurds, at long last, to begin governing themselves. And so they have, with a determination born of historic vengeance.

Kurds no longer speak Arabic, but various dialects of Kurdish, in offices and schools throughout the 74,000 square miles that comprise their provinces. They fly their own flag, provide their own services, raise their own army -- the legendarily disciplined Pesh Merga, or "Those Who Face Death" -- and have gradually consolidated their de facto state. Divided between two parties -- Mr. Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party, his clan's power base in north Kurdistan, and the southern-based Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by Jalal Talabani, now president of Iraq (or "President of the Green Zone" as Kurds here call the post) -- Kurdistan is booming with construction, new businesses and ambitious dreams of self-rule.

Washington's refusal to accept this self-evident political reality does not trouble Mr. Barzani. On the contrary, he insists Kurdistan will remain part of Iraq -- as long as Iraq remains federal, secular and democratic, and officially blesses the autonomy the Kurds managed to enshrine in the new Iraqi constitution. Besides, the fig-leaf of Iraq is useful: Declaring independence would risk provoking Turkey, for whom an independent Kurdish state is anathema given its own 18-million strong Kurdish population and the continued existence of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party -- the PKK -- on the Iraqi-Kurdish side of the border. Yet Mr. Barzani adamantly denies that his fidelity to Iraq is born of fear. "Having an independent state is the natural legitimate right of our people," he insisted. "We are not ready to say that because we fear displeasing our neighbors or because we are frightened that they may attack. That's not the case," he said. "We say that because at this stage, the parliament of Kurdistan has decided to remain within a federal, democratic Iraq."

Kurdish aspirations for autonomy, however, clearly require Turkish and Iranian acquiescence, or a persuasive reason for Turkey not to attack. Hence the desire for the redeployment of some American forces to Kurdistan. "The presence of American forces here would be a deterrent to intervention by the neighboring countries," Mr. Barzani says, with characteristic bluntness.

That is unlikely any time soon, say officials in Washington. How would the presence of American forces in what one official called a "land-locked aircraft carrier" help prevent the emergence of an Islamist entity in Iraq's Sunni-dominated center or deter Iranian control of the Shiite south? Moreover, as President Bush noted last week, dismissing proposals to carve Iraq into three virtually autonomous regions as destabilizing, such a division of Iraq would exacerbate Sunni-on-Sunni and Sunni-on-Shiite tensions. "The Kurds will then create problems for Turkey and Syria," President Bush said.

On the contrary, Mr. Barzani insists, Kurdistan seeks good relations "with all its neighbors." Indeed, Turkish-Kurdish and Kurdish-Iranian talks have been ongoing, diplomats say. As for Baghdad, Mr. Barzani adds, no one has tried harder to keep Iraq from splitting apart than the Kurds. "We worked hard with the Sunni community to bring them into the process," he says, "and also to establish Iraq's governing council, the interim and transitional government, and the drafting of the constitution. We played a leading role in the success of the process." But he was clearly annoyed by a slight: The fact that the congressionally created Iraq Study Group, headed by former Republican Secretary of State James Baker and Democratic co-chair Lee Hamilton, which is weighing policy alternatives for Iraq, has not traveled to Kurdistan -- the only successful region of postwar Iraq -- to consult with him. "It's a huge failing in their deliberations," he says. "We remain willing and ready to help whenever our assistance is needed."

Mr. Barzani is not shy about offering advice to Washington. The U.S. needs to revise its policies because "the existing strategy is not effective," he says. American forces could be reduced -- perhaps by half -- he said, but only when Iraqi forces are ready to restore order. But that will not happen, he warns, until the U.S. permits the Iraqi government to rid itself of the "terrorists, chauvinists and extremists" in its ranks who condone and "openly incite the violence on TV" that is destroying what remains of the capital and the country. He refuses to name names. But other Kurds point to such figures as Salah Mutlaq, an

extremist Sunni leader, and aides to Moqtada al-Sadr, who heads a radical Shia militia.

"You have a different culture; you're a different people," Mr. Barzani said. "With America's mentality and approach and regulations, we cannot win like this. There must be decisive action so the government can enforce the law and restore its prestige." This Barzani, confident and candid, is different from the reticent figure I first interviewed 15 years ago in his mountain fastness of Barzan. Although plainspoken, "Kak Massoud" -- a respectful but affectionate "Mister" in Kurdish -- was reluctant then to offer an American journalist a frank assessment of his frustrations and aspirations. Not so the man who has evolved into "President Barzani" of Kurdistan, who, based on an informal power-sharing agreement with his rival, President Talibani of Iraq, is determined to seize this historic opportunity to advance his people's interests.

Just as "Kak" has become "president," the Kurds have gone from resistance to nation-building, with all the challenges such a transformation implies. Mr. Barzani has complained that while he and his Pesh Merga knew how to fight, it was "easier to destroy two dams than to build one power plant." Kurdistan is changing, in substance as well as style. The capital is no longer called Erbil (the Arabic), but "Howler," its Kurdish name. While Mr. Barzani, age 60, still wears the pantaloons, cummerbund, tight jacket and twirled turban favored by traditional Kurds, Western-style business suits -- expensive labels, at that -- are favored by Nechervan Barzani, his nephew and the energetic 40-year-old prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Gone are the refugee tents -- except for the thousands of Sunni Arab refugees from Baghdad, who, along with some 7,000 Christian families, have migrated here for safety. Temporary structures are being replaced by new brick and cement houses and apartment buildings -- among them many lavish "castles," as the Kurds call these houses nestled in the hills surrounding Erbil. Expensive glass office buildings are springing up throughout the region. Apartments are priced at between \$100,000 and \$200,000 -- prohibitively expensive; and yet several of these are sold out.

"Kurds have money," Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani told me. "But until recently, they lacked the confidence to invest." If the junior Mr. Barzani is correct, Kurdistan is literally exploding with confidence and new projects befitting its ambitions: Almost \$2 billion in Turkish trade and investment -- the result, partly, of his outreach to Ankara -- is financing the construction the Middle East's largest new conference center, a new international airport, hotels, parks, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, a refinery and an electrical plant. The Kurdistan Development Council is even advertising Kurdistan as a tourist destination. There are over 70 direct flights a week to the region's two airports from the Middle East and Europe. But Kurdistan's infrastructure is still woefully antiquated, a legacy of Saddam's privation and the ruinous civil war between the clans of Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani from 1994 to 1998. Most cities still provide only two-to-three hours of electricity a day. The rest comes from private generators, which the poor can ill afford.

Last spring, public resentment at the lack of services erupted among the frustrated residents of half a dozen Kurdish towns. Consider Halabja, which became instantly infamous in 1988 when Saddam's forces dropped nerve gas there, killing 5,000. In March, its residents trashed the expensive monument erected to commemorate their annihilation, setting the structure on fire and stripping the black marble slabs on which the names of gas attack victims had been etched in gold. On my visit last week, two Pesh Merga were playing "dama," a Kurdish version of chess, with pieces of the marble that had been torn off the wall.

Kurds are now restless after so many years of deprivation, and their expectations are high, Mr. Barzani agreed: "My main objective is to build constitutional institutions in this country, to see a Kurdistan 10 years from now in which each person is safe and free to have his own ideas." He and other government officials were determined to "put the Kurdish house in order," which means continuing to encourage the effort by Nechervan Barzani to join supporters from his and Mr. Talibani's group into one efficient administration. Although grumbling about corruption and nepotism disturbs him, security and political solidarity at home must come first.

* * *

As Mr. Barzani carefully stresses his devotion to Iraqiness -- all the while promoting a political and economic agenda that would reinforce Kurdish exceptionalism -- Americans struggle for an elusive solution to the violence and ethnic strife that abounds. Mr. Barzani wishes the U.S. success, he says, because so much depends on George Bush's determination not to "cut and run." His "courageous decision to liberate Iraq will not be undermined by the mistakes made after that liberation," Mr. Barzani says, although he does resort to an American cliché: "If there are people who think the solution lies in leaving this unfinished, just like Vietnam, that would be a major disaster."

Ms. Miller, a former New York Times reporter, is a writer in New York.

*Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430*

Questions 11 & 12:

Preamble:

Republic of China (Taiwan):

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the Republic of China (Taiwan). All informational materials either distributed or facilitated by Registrant on behalf of Principal are attached.

2017 DEC 17 11:19:35
COMM/REGISTRATION/REGISTRATION

DATE OF CONTACT	U.S. GOVT. OFFICIAL CONTACTED	MANNER IN WHICH CONTACT WAS MADE	SUBJECT MATTER
June 5	Evan Feigenbaum, Department of State	Office Meeting	Taiwan
June 14	David Keegan, AIT Deputy Director	Office Meeting	Taiwan
June 22	Marc Koehler, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	Taiwan
June 22	Samantha Ravich, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	Taiwan
June 27	Dennis Halpin, House International Relations Committee	Office Meeting	Taiwan
June 27	Ford Hart, State Department	Email	Taiwan
July 3	Philip Zelikow, State Department	Meeting	Taiwan
July 11	Angela Ellard, House Ways and Means Committee	Email	Taiwan
August 2	Bob Zoellick, State Department	Office Meeting	Taiwan
August 9	Ambassador Chris Hill	Office Meeting	Taiwan
August 21	Brian Gatson, Majority Whip Roy Blunt (R-MO)	Telephone Call	Taiwan
August 24	Angela Ellard, House Ways and Means Committee	Email	Taiwan
August 29	Angela Ellard, House Ways and Means Committee	Telephone Call	Taiwan
August 30	Dennis Wilder, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Taiwan
August 31	Rob Wasinger, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS)	Emails	Taiwan
September 5	Tinna Jackson, Senator John Ensign (R-NV)	Email	Taiwan
September 6	Dennis Wilder, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Taiwan
September 6	Tinna Jackson, Senator John Ensign (R-NV)	Email	Taiwan
September 7	Brett Loper, Congressman Jim McCrery (R-LA)	Email	Taiwan
September 7	Mimi Roberts, Congressman Jim McCrery (R-LA)	Email	Taiwan
September 11	Beth Sanford, Senator Saxby	Email	Taiwan

	Chambliss (R-GA)		
September 12	Ambassador Bhatia, USTR	Office Meeting	Taiwan
September 15	Guy Harrison, Congressman Pete Sessions (R-TX)	Email	Taiwan
September 18	Tinna Jackson, Senator John Ensign (R-NV)	Email	Taiwan
September 21	Chris Pollack, Congressman Clay Shaw, (R-FL)	Email	Taiwan
September 22	Dennis Wilder, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Taiwan
October 4	Kevin Fitzpatrick, Congressman Pete Sessions, (R-TX) and Scott Cunningham, Congressman Steve Chabot (R-OH)	Office Meeting	Taiwan
October 5	Chad Davis, Congressman Clay Shaw (R-FL)	Email	Taiwan
October 5	Kevin Fitzpatrick, Congressman Steve Chabot (R-OH)	Email	Taiwan
October 5	Ford Hart, State Department	Telephone Call	Taiwan
October 10	Bob Holste, Congressman Phil English (R-PA)	Email	Taiwan
October 13	Annette Carr, Congressman Phil English (R-PA)	Email	Taiwan
October 19	Rob Wasinger, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS)	Email	Taiwan
October 19	Bob Holste, Congressman Phil English (R-PA)	Email	Taiwan
October 19	Annette Carr, Congressman Phil English (R-PA)	Email	Taiwan
October 19	Glen Downs, Congressman Walter Jones, (R-NC)	Email	Taiwan
October 19	Kathie Gallina, Congressman Walt Jones, (R-NC)	Email	Taiwan
October 23	Rob Wasinger, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS)	Email	Taiwan
October 23	Bob Zoellick, State Department	Telephone Call	Taiwan
October 25	Brett Loper, Congressman Jim McCrery (R-LA)	Email	Taiwan

October 23	Bob Zoellick, State Department	Telephone Call	Taiwan
November 6	Isaac Edwards, Office of Senator Murkowski	Telephone Call	Taiwan
November 17	Tinna Jackson, Senator John Ensign (R, NV)	Email	Taiwan

2007 OCT 13 11 09 55
 CH/MS/SECURITY/INT

*Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430*

Questions 11 & 12:

Preamble:

State of Qatar:

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the State of Qatar.

2017 OCT 19 10:19:35
CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT

***Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430***

Questions 11 & 12:

State of Qatar, Embassy: During the reporting period, the Registrant engaged in political activities relating to two areas: 1) Monitoring and advising on U.S. policymaking processes with regard to the State of Qatar; 2) Arranging meetings between officials from Qatar and U.S. officials.

The means employed to achieve these objectives included holding meetings and briefings with Executive Branch officials in the U.S. Department of State. The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor, or deliver any speeches, lectures or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the State of Qatar.

DATE OF CONTACT	U.S. GOVT. OFFICIAL CONTACTED	MANNER IN WHICH CONTACT WAS MADE	SUBJECT MATTER
July 24	Office of Public Liasion Conference call with USTR Ambassador Susan Schwab	Office Meeting	Doha Trade

2017 DEC 19 11 09 55
CRM/REGISTRATION UNIT

*Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.
Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430*

Questions 11 & 12:

Preamble:

Government of India:

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the Government of India. All informational materials either distributed or facilitated by Registrant on behalf of Principal are attached.

201 SEP 12 04:19:25
GRIFFITH & ROGERS, LLC
FBI/DOJ

271-553-12 11/25/05

Date of Contact	U.S. Govt. Official Contacted	Manner in Which Contact Was Made	Subject Matter
June 2	Anja Manuel, State Department	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 5	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 6	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 6	Staff of Chairman Richard Lugar	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 7	Janice O'Connell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 7	Elizabeth Hays, Judiciary Committee	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 7	Doug Seay, House International Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 8	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 9	Lorianne Woodrow, Senator Norm Coleman	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 9	Staff of Chairman Richard Lugar	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 9	Staff of Senator George Allen	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 12	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 13	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 14	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 14	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Mohamed El Baradei's June 14 <i>Washington Post</i> op-ed
June 15	David Fite, House	Office Meetings	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear

	International Relations Committee		Agreement
June 16	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 16	Staff of Rep. Tom Lantos	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 16	Jeffrey Bergner, Department of State	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 19	Brian McCormick, White House staff	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 19	Neal Patel, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 19	Dino Teppara, Office of Congressman Joe Wilson	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 20	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 21	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 21	Brent Perry, Office of Senator Allen	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 21	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	William Cohen's June 21 <i>Washington Post</i> op-ed
June 22	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 22	Staff of Vice President Dick Cheney	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 23	Tony Blinken, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 23	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	Meeting with Congressman Ed Royce	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	David Adams, House	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear

	International Relations Committee		Agreement
June 26	Staff of Senator Lamar Alexander	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	Michael Allen, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 26	Staff of Chairman Richard Lugar	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 28	Anja Manuel, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 28	Staff of Chairman Richard Lugar	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 28	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 28	Tony Blinken, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 29	Anja Manuel, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
June 29	Pam Thiessen, Office of Senator Ensign	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 3	Phillip Zelikow, State Department	Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 6	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Press Release and a report by Dr. Ashley Tellis
July 6	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 6	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 7	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 7	David Fite, House International Relations	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement

	Committee		
July 10	Staff of Rep. Charles Boustany	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 10	Anja Manuel, State Department	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 10	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 11	Reb Browell, Office of Senator Mitch McConnell	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 12	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 12	Staff of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 12	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Secretary Rice's July 10 remarks on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 13	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 13	Staff of Senator John Kyl	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 17	Correspondence to Speaker Hastert circulated by U.S. Chamber of Commerce	Correspondence, Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 18	Staff of Senator John Kyl	Correspondence Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 19	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 20	Bob Nickel, State Department	Conference Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 20	Conference Call with White House	Conference Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 21	Michael Stransky, Senate Republican Policy Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 21	Steve Rademaker, Office of Senator Frist	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 21	Deb Fiddelke, White	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear

	House		Agreement
July 21	Staff of Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 25	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 26	Brian McCormack, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
July 26	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Ambassador Pickering and Ambassador Wisner's July 26 <i>Washington Post</i> op-ed
July 28	Staff of Chairman Henry Hyde	Correspondence, Email, Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
August 9	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
August 9	Jeffrey Bergner, Department of State	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
August 9	Peter Rodman, Department of Defense	Office Meeting, BGR	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
August 10	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
August 30	Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, Department of State	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 5	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 5	Anja Manuel, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 5	Brian Falls, Office of Congressman Burton	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 6	Tinna Jackson, Senator John Ensign, (R-NV)	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 6	Brian McCormack, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 7	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 11	Steve Rademaker, Office of Senator Frist	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement

September 14	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 18	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 18	Brian McCormack, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 18	Steve Rademaker, Office of Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 20	Tony Blinken, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 21	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Telephone call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 21	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Pam Thiessen, Senator John Ensign, (R-NV)	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Bob Nickel, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Conference Call with the U.S. India Business Council	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Stephen Rademaker, Office of Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Chris Stone, Office of Senator Bingaman	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 22	Meeting with top Bush Administration officials	White House Strategy Session	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 25	Stephen Rademaker, Office of Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 26	Tony Blinken, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 27	Pam Thiessen, Senator John Ensign, (R-NV)	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 27	Brian Diffell, Majority Whip Roy Blunt (R-MO)	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 28	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement

	Committee		
September 29	Stephen Rademaker, Office of Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
September 29	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 3	Keith Luse, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 18	Neil Patel, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 18	Rob Brownell, Office of Senator McConnell	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 24	Rich Verma, Office of Senator Harry Reid	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 24	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 25	Stephen Rademaker, Office of Senator Bill Frist, (R-TN)	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 30	Brian McCormack, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 27	Angela Ellard, House Ways & Means Committee	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 31	Bruce Brown, State Department	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
October 31	Neil Patel, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 1	Angela Ellard and David Kavanaugh, House Ways & Means Committee	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 1	Jamie McCormick, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 1	Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, Department of State	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 3	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 7	Brian McCormack, White House	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 13	Candi Wolff, White House	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and

			Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 13	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Office Meeting	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 13	Rich Verma, Office of Senator Reid	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 15	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 15	Brian Diffell, Majority Whip Roy Blunt, (R-MO)	Email	U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 15	Neil Patel, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 17	David Fite, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 20	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Conference Call with the U.S. India Business Council	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 20	Doug Seay, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
November 30	Ken Krieg, Department of Defense	Office meeting with the U.S. India Business Council	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 1	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Conference Call with the U.S. India Business Council	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 1	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 5	Puneet Talwar, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 5	Tom Mooney, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 5	Hillel Weinberg, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 5	Brent Perry, Office of Senator Allen (R-VA)	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 5	Paul Teller, Republican Study Committee	Telephone Call	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement
December 6	Jeff Bergner, State Department	Conference Call with the U.S. India Business Council	U.S.-India Relations and Civil Nuclear Agreement

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COMMUNICATIONS UNIT

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Westerman, Stefanie

From: Westerman, Stefanie on behalf of Parasiliti, Andrew
Sent: Monday, June 05, 2006 1:15 PM
Subject: Weekly Standard: "Ink the India Deal"

Dear Colleague,

I would like to bring to your attention the article (below) by Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, "Ink the India Deal," in the June 12, 2006, issue of *The Weekly Standard*. The link can be found at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=12294&R=ECBB1B097.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Parasiliti

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JUN 12 2006
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REGISTRATION UNIT

Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation of the Government of India. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

Ink the India Deal

The pact with New Delhi is too important to derail.
by Tom Donnelly & Vance Serchuk
06/12/2006, Volume 011, Issue 37

WILL AMERICA'S PARTNERSHIP WITH INDIA fall victim to politics? The Bush administration's proposed agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi--once predicted to win approval from Congress as early as June--is under a growing cloud. With the November midterm elections fast approaching, the legislative calendar crowded, and the White House weakened, the happy talk about a new relationship with India so much in evidence during President Bush's trip to South Asia this spring has receded, leaving in its place the realization that we could be in for yet another long, hard slog.

As Congress heads into the summer and the administration works damage control, the time is right to take a fresh look at the case for India--not just the nuclear deal but a strategic partnership generally--reminding ourselves why it is so important to pull off this power play.

6/5/2006

The experience of the recent past has shown--even to the allegedly diehard unilateralists of the Bush administration--that the forces struggling against the Pax Americana are stronger and more resourceful than once imagined. In a world where terrorists act like great powers, and great powers are few and far between, the possibility of an alliance with a large, rising, free-market democracy with a serious martial tradition is one that should be seized.

The case for India, in short, is about more than the relationship between two great nations. It is the case for institutionalizing a certain kind of international order: what President Bush has called "a balance of power that favors freedom."

NO MATTER WHEN YOU DATE the beginning of the relationship, America and India got off on the wrong foot. The United States broke away from the British Empire just as South Asia was being conquered by it. A century and a half later, relations between Washington and postpartition Delhi got caught in the chill of the Cold War. Even after the Soviet collapse, relations with Delhi remained stagnant, dominated by the nonproliferation community and advocates of a "hyphenated" approach to India and Pakistan: Rather than engaging with each country on its merits, the United States adopted a relentlessly trilateral attitude toward the subcontinent during the 1990s.

The Clinton administration began to break this logjam in its final years, beginning with a dialogue between Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and the Indian minister of external affairs, Jaswant Singh. At the time, Pakistan's burgeoning support for terrorist groups, its nuclear proliferation, abandonment of democracy, and client-patron relationship with the Taliban--the rap sheet of a rogue state--made the old pretense of equivalence harder to sustain.

Enter George W. Bush, whose presidential campaign in 2000 emphasized a renewed focus on great power relations in foreign policy and suggested a particular soft spot for India. Even so, nothing could have prepared Delhi for the charm offensive the new administration unleashed during its first eight months in office.

Robert Blackwill, one of Bush's foreign policy advisers from the campaign, was named ambassador, while a steady stream of senior officials dropped in to Delhi throughout the spring and summer of 2001. Jaswant Singh, who was favored in Washington with a long walk around the Rose Garden with the president, predicted that U.S.-Indian cooperation would result in "a totally new security regime." Bush was expected to visit India in late 2001 or early 2002.

The September 11 attacks disrupted those plans and might well have done deeper damage to the budding relationship, as the old balancing games with Pakistan threatened to reemerge. The mood further cooled after Islamist terrorists attacked the Indian parliament in December 2001, and there ensued several months of intensive, hair-raising diplomacy by the United States and Britain to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war with Pakistan. Western demands during this period grated on Indian officials, and by the time the crisis had been defused, international attention was turning toward Iraq.

And yet, away from the limelight, patient discussions with the Indians proceeded. And despite the tensions and disruptions, the geopolitical order that began to emerge in their wake actually accelerated the strategic convergence of Washington and Delhi in unexpected ways.

Consider the three overarching security challenges that the United States has stressed in the post-9/11 world: radical Islam, nuclear-armed rogue states, and the rise of China. These dangers also confront America's traditional allies, but in varying, mostly lesser, degrees. India is one of the few states to score the same trifecta as America.

Begin with the fact that more Indians have been killed by radical Islamists over the past decade than any other nationality. From the strike on the Indian parliament in 2001, which killed a dozen people and injured twice as many, to the bombings this spring in Varanasi, which killed 15 and injured more than 60, India is a frontline state in the war on terror.

India also has more than passing familiarity with the threat posed by rogue, terror-sponsoring states armed with weapons of mass destruction. Indian policymakers have watched as Pakistan, since acquiring its nuclear deterrent, has been emboldened in its strategy of sponsoring "third party" attacks against Delhi--safe in the knowledge that India can't retaliate conventionally without risking mutually assured destruction. More dramatically, the potential destabilization or radicalization of Pakistan--terrifying as it is for war planners in Washington to contemplate--represents a near-existential threat for planners in Delhi.

Finally, there's China. Before September 11, Beijing's rise was the most commonly cited rationale for closer ties to India. Critics have countered that it's premature, futile, or dangerous to believe that Delhi can be used as a balancer against the PRC. In fact, both claims are simplistic. Policymakers in Delhi want their country to take advantage of China's economic boom every bit as much as their colleagues in Washington. But at the same time, Indian strategists are concerned about China's military buildup, its growing regional influence, and its relentless global search for natural resources.

Granted, India isn't likely to sign up for an aggressive containment regime aimed at Beijing any time soon; but then, neither are we. Rather, India and the United States share an interest in encouraging China to become a stakeholder in an international system dominated by liberal democracies, while maneuvering to hedge against any challenges that Beijing might be tempted to mount.

Even so, cooperation between the United States and India is driven by more than just a calculus of shared dangers. It springs from shared political principles. As Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan has eloquently put it, India is "the single most important adherent of the Enlightenment in the non-Western world," representing "the triumph of the values of reason, cosmopolitanism, scientific progress, and individual freedom against great odds."

What's more, in contrast to world-weary Europeans, profoundly cynical of projects to remake the world, Indian policymakers often share Americans' faith in the universality of political liberalism. As a 2002 study commissioned by the Pentagon concluded from interviews with dozens of Indian civilian and military leaders, "Indians believe that as the only democracy in South Asia--and a highly successful 'democratic experiment'--they are the appropriate model for developing countries around the Indian Ocean basin."

India's location in the middle of a rough neighborhood also makes its population more likely to appreciate that the defense of freedom requires the taking up of arms. While Europeans have let their defense establishments go to seed, India is pressing ahead to develop a modern military capable of projecting power. Delhi already commands one of the best navies in Asia, not to mention the third largest air force and fourth largest army in the world.

Indeed, when it comes to questions of global power, India is moving in precisely the opposite direction from Europe. As Mohan has argued, "While Europe was the principal arena of conflict in the world, India could posture about the problems of deterrence, containment and the Cold War. The Europeans, in contrast, emphasized the centrality of defeating totalitarian ideologies. But today with the focus of the new war on terrorism being riveted on the Middle East and South Asia, India is far more sensitive to the complexities of the battle and the importance of imparting a resounding defeat to the forces of

extremism and terrorism."

"INDIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY is a natural partner of the United States," said President Bush during his trip to Delhi in March, and it's easy to see why. But even if the desirability of a closer relationship between the world's two largest pluralistic, free-market democracies is a no-brainer, there's still the issue of how to make it happen.

The first comprehensive attempt at rapprochement by the Bush administration and its Indian counterparts came in 2004 and pledged Delhi and Washington to work together in four contentious areas: civilian space programs, high-technology trade, missile defense, and civilian nuclear energy. This was followed in July 2005 by the visit of Prime Minister Singh to the White House, where landmark proposals on bilateral cooperation, including civilian nuclear power, were announced. Several months of negotiations over the contours of the nuclear agreement followed, resulting in the deal announced in Delhi this March.

Briefly, the agreement promises to bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream. In exchange for full trade in civil nuclear energy, India has agreed to separate its military and civilian nuclear programs over the next eight years, placing 14 of its 22 reactors under permanent international safeguards, as well as all future civilian thermal and breeder reactors. It has also agreed to maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and to work with the United States toward a fissile material cutoff treaty, which would ban the production of fissile material, like plutonium-239, used in nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

Critics have argued that the Bush administration's decision to tackle head-on the thorny question of Delhi's nuclear status was a miscalculation. Rather than focusing attention on a divisive issue, they suggest, Washington and Delhi should have first gone after the low-hanging fruit in fields like trade, economic development, and military-to-military cooperation.

This is an appealing argument, but there are several problems with it. For starters, the Bush administration and the Singh government have pursued those other avenues of cooperation, and with vigor. Although you'd hardly know it from the press coverage, energy cooperation was just one element of the July 18 U.S.-Indian Joint Statement. Perhaps the nuclear issue distracted attention from the other proposals--although a "Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture" might not have made the front pages on the slowest of days.

What cannot be said is that the nuclear deal has inhibited broader bilateral cooperation. On the contrary, the past year has witnessed a quiet explosion of wonky agreements, initiatives, treaties, delegations, and bilateral consultations between the United States and India. And although the Bush administration might have succeeded in pushing these in the absence of the nuclear deal, there's no question that the agreement gave the relationship a new momentum. That's precisely why proponents of the U.S. strategy argued for disposing of the nuclear albatross in the first place: Only if this were done, they insisted, could the broader partnership get off the ground. And so far, it looks like they were right.

It's also worth noting that the Bush administration--with less than three years to go in office--has its own reasons to be leery of a go-slow approach. In the past, closer U.S.-Indian ties have been hamstrung by hostile bureaucracies and personalities in Washington or Delhi or both. Since 2005, however, the constellation of power in the two capitals has been almost perfectly aligned. Condoleezza Rice and her team at the State Department are united in their push for a nuclear deal, even as the Indian prime minister is prepared to spend political capital to reach an accord. It's an opportunity that may no longer exist come January 2009. Given that uncertainty, it's hard to blame Bush and Singh for deciding to be bold.

As for the substance of the deal itself, there is a growing body of literature--both in India and the United States--about whether it gave away too much or too little, whether it will be good or bad for the cause of nonproliferation, and so on. This debate reveals the extent to which the agreement is the product of a genuine compromise by both sides; the suggestion that Delhi took Washington to the cleaners, or vice versa, simply doesn't hold up. It should also send a cautionary signal to congressional leaders who think they can reverse-engineer eight months' delicate diplomacy by rewriting the agreement in the months ahead. (As congressman Tom Lantos sagely put it, "Every member of Congress could come up with a more perfect agreement--but we could not sell it to the government of India.")

Like any challenge to the status quo, the agreement has also riled entrenched constituencies, who are now on the warpath. For the most strident members of the American nonproliferation community, the very notion of nuclear accommodation with India is nothing short of apostasy--the start of a slippery slope toward an atomic Armageddon in which everyone from Japan to Saudi Arabia to Liechtenstein will end up with ICBMs.

In fact, the deal with India does establish a double standard. But as Robert Kagan has pointed out, the Nonproliferation Treaty itself established a double standard long ago, and "a particularly mindless kind of double standard" at that. The NPT, after all, is "not based on justice or morality or strategic judgment or politics but simply on circumstance: Whoever had figured out how to build nuclear weapons by 1968 was in. At least our double standard for India makes strategic, diplomatic, ideological, and political sense."

The histrionic claims about Iran and other rogue states are considerably flimsier. Tehran has a nuclear weapons program because--surprise!--it wants nuclear weapons, and specifically the freedom of action they will grant the regime against its adversaries. The deal with India may give the Islamic Republic a talking point or two at the U.N., but it will not sway the behavior of any country engaged in the real world struggle with Iran, or the regime itself. That dispute is being shaped by hard-nosed, and often crude, calculations of national interest and power, not what happens between the United States and India.

That said, the nuclear deal with India does contain risks. As Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the most incisive critic of the agreement, has warned, it's certain to push Pakistan toward further development of its own nuclear arsenal, aided and abetted by China. It may also provoke China into overt nuclear competition with India, laying the groundwork for an arms race in Asia.

But this critique--in framing the nuclear deal as a choice between a destabilizing arms race and a benign status quo--fails to consider two questions: Is it in the U.S. national interest to keep India in a position of permanent strategic weakness vis-à-vis China? And, in the absence of the nuclear deal, is a rising India itself likely to accept a position of inferiority?

The answer, in both instances, is no. Like it or not, Asia is going to be the scene of geopolitical competition in the twenty-first century. The issue at hand is how intelligently the United States can manage it.

To its credit, the White House seems to grasp the importance of the regional dynamic in pursuing its entente with India--although, for obvious reasons, it cannot make too much of it publicly. As Ashley Tellis, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment and an architect of the nuclear deal, has argued: "If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery

systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025."

Ditching the agreement would not make Indian nuclear weapons or the prospect of Indo-Chinese rivalry go away. Instead, it would align Washington with Beijing in its bid to confine and contain Indian power--a very strange position for the United States to be in. India, meanwhile, would no doubt seek out other patrons to protect its national interests. It's no coincidence that Jacques Chirac was in Delhi a week before President Bush this spring, touting the benefits of Franco-Indian nuclear cooperation.

The Bush administration's proposed deal, moreover, would not only strengthen India's geopolitical position in Asia, but also provide Washington with new opportunities to influence New Delhi's strategic calculus, both in the short and long term.

The recent confrontation with Iran over its own nuclear program at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides a case in point. India has long hoped to build a 1,700-mile gas pipeline from Iran to satisfy its rising demand for energy. Despite pointed threats from Tehran, however, Delhi voted twice with the United States against Iran at the IAEA. It did this precisely because the prospect of the nuclear agreement with the United States outweighed its interest in placating the mullahs. India, incidentally, was the only member of the nonaligned movement to do so.

Much of the leverage that the nuclear deal would afford the United States would come in subtler forms. As America and India became accustomed to working closely together, each government would have a greater incentive to consult the other, both to preempt and defuse disagreements, and to identify and exploit new fields of cooperation. Strategic partnership thus becomes self-reinforcing.

Public perceptions can play an important role in this process. It's notable that, over the past few years, India has bucked the global trend toward anti-Americanism, with more than 70 percent of its citizens expressing a favorable view of the United States. That's up from 54 percent in 2002 and the highest U.S. approval rating in any country polled by Pew. On Iraq, India is the only country other than America where a plurality believes the removal of Saddam Hussein has made the world safer.

Statistics like this are important not only because they validate the Bush administration's outreach efforts, but also because, in a democratic polity such as India, pro-American views can help empower pro-American governments. And as the Indian public increasingly sees the United States as a friend and ally, they are likely to be more willing to listen to Washington's arguments on topics where we do not immediately agree.

Americans, of course, are accustomed to thinking of alliances as quid pro quo arrangements: You give us basing rights, we put you under our security umbrella. You give us access to your markets, we give you access to ours. But this kind of analysis works poorly with a rising power like India.

Rather, the institutional framework that the Bush administration is constructing with Delhi is best understood as a long-term investment in a stock that is going to appreciate in the years ahead. As one U.S. military officer observed, "The costs of building a relationship with India today are significantly lower than the costs of facing India as a spoiler in the future. Moreover, the costs of building a relationship with India will probably increase over time."

SO LET'S ASSUME that the Bush administration succeeds in pushing through the nuclear deal in more or less salvageable form. What then?

To be sure, the raft of programs that the White House and the Singh government have already initiated

can keep bureaucrats in both capitals beaver away for years to come. With luck, these linkages will build constituencies, and these constituencies will help sustain the relationship--irrespective of the inevitable changes in national leadership.

In the interim, however, there are several areas where the two governments could still push ahead more aggressively, especially in defense policy. The security of the Indian Ocean is a top concern for both the United States and India, as well as the first object of India's military modernization. Given India's naval assets, the country's integration into a network of Asian-Pacific democracies is an obvious long-term objective.

Central Asia is another arena where Washington and Delhi can work more closely together. From energy security to democracy promotion to the stabilization of Afghanistan, they have a wide range of common interests there. Building a road or railroad into Afghanistan should be an immediate priority. Not only would it undercut the rationale for Indian-Iranian relations, but regional economic integration is also the best hope for success in Kabul. If Washington wants a long-term partner in the transformation of the Hindu Kush, it should look toward Delhi, not Brussels.

There's also much to be gained by deeper military cooperation between Delhi and Washington. Although there's been progress on this front in recent years, senior policymakers would do well to keep a close eye on the details. Defense-industrial cooperation, managed properly, can do wonders to help secure an alliance; botched, it can inflict irreparable harm.

Although a more sensitive subject, the United States should also be quietly thinking about basing arrangements with India. As Stephen Blank at the Army War College, among others, has observed, "American force posture remains dangerously thin in the arc--many thousands of miles long--between Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Okinawa and Guam in the Pacific." Given the range of threats that could arise in this region, access to Indian real estate would be very valuable.

The United States should also embrace India's bid for a larger role in international institutions, including seats at the G-8 and on the U.N. Security Council. If nothing else, this would help push India's foreign policy elites to think more like leaders of a great power and less like advocates of the nonaligned movement. A U.N. seat for India, along with one for Japan, would also have the advantage of breaking Beijing's Asian monopoly on the council.

Beyond these bilateral initiatives, a global partnership with India will depend on reforms and policies internal to both countries. For Delhi, this means, above all, good stewardship of its economy. The encouraging news here is that India is booming; its economy is averaging approximately 9 percent growth, the second-highest in the world.

But beyond the headlines, India remains a very poor country, with 25 percent of its population living below the poverty line. Economic development here is not only a moral imperative; it is also crucial for India's emergence as a major power and its viability as a model for other countries to follow.

The nuclear deal would aid that process somewhat by helping Delhi expand and diversify the energy sector on which so much of its growth depends. (India's energy needs are expected to double by 2025.) Even more important are nonnuclear reforms that would improve India's energy efficiency, which is currently abysmal. The United States could help here, with an expanded energy dialogue and technical assistance, but much of the heavy lifting would ultimately fall to India itself.

For the United States, the growing importance of India raises questions about the way our foreign policy bureaucracy is organized. To take one example: In the Defense Department, India is on the periphery of

U.S. Pacific Command, while Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia are assigned to U.S. Central Command. This arrangement cuts an artificial seam through the heart of Asia, complicating any attempt to develop coherent strategy toward the whole. Simply put, having the four-star general responsible for India eight and a half time zones away from Delhi is dangerously dumb.

One solution might be to establish a joint subregional command that would bind together South and Central Asia, and assign it the task of coordinating between CENTCOM and PACOM. The logical place to put this post would be Afghanistan, which is already home to a large American troop presence, not to mention a U.S. subregional command, with Pakistan and Central Asia in its area of responsibility. With NATO expected to take charge in Afghanistan this fall, the Pentagon is going to need to come up with a new framework for the region anyway--and as the British and Russians alike understood a century ago, there's no better back door to India than Afghanistan.

"FIVE WASTED DECADES." That is how Jaswant Singh characterized U.S.-Indian relations on the eve of President Clinton's visit to Delhi, and rightly so. Six years later, President Bush has done more than any leader since 1947 to transform Washington's relationship with Delhi. The question now before Congress is whether to endorse the partnership that we are at last on the threshold of securing--or condemn it to yet another wasted decade.

To be clear on this point, if Congress rejects the nuclear deal--or allows it to unravel by legislative nitpicking--the result will be a devastating setback to U.S.-Indian relations. Just as the agreement helped spur cooperation on a range of fronts, its collapse would disrupt a range of interactions.

The resistance to the nuclear deal is made all the more ironic by the fact that the White House's Indian diplomacy cuts against many of the stereotypes about President Bush's foreign policy. It is a step toward a long-term alliance, grounded in shared interests and principles, not a temporary coalition of the willing. It is a deliberate courtship of a rising power, not a shotgun marriage with a client state. Most important, it is a rare instance of the White House successfully closing the gap between ambition and implementation that has dogged its initiatives, from democracy promotion to the war in Iraq. If a balance of power in favor of freedom is to come into being, it simply must include India.

Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk are fellows at the American Enterprise Institute.

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CENTCOM/AFCEC/INTEL UNIT

Westerman, Stefanie

From: Barbour Griffith & Rogers International
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 10:09 AM
Subject: Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards, The Washington Post

Dear Colleague,

I would like to bring to your attention the article (below) by Mohamed ElBaradei, "Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards," published today, June 14, 2006, in *The Washington Post*.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Parasiliti

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Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation of the Government of India. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

The Washington Post
Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards
By MOHAMED ELBARADEI
Wednesday, June 14, 2006; A23

In regard to nuclear proliferation and arms control, the fundamental problem is clear: Either we begin finding creative, outside-the-box solutions or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete.

For this reason, I have been calling for new approaches in a number of areas. First, a recommitment to disarmament -- a move away from national security strategies that rely on nuclear weapons, which serve as a constant stimulus for other nations to acquire them. Second, tightened controls on the proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. By bringing multinational control to any operation that enriches uranium or separates plutonium, we can lower the risk of these materials being diverted to weapons. A parallel step would be to create a mechanism to ensure a reliable supply of reactor fuel to bona fide users, including a fuel bank under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The third area has been more problematic: how to deal creatively with the three countries that remain outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Pakistan and India, both holders of nuclear arsenals, and Israel, which maintains an official policy of ambiguity but is believed to be nuclear-weapons-

6/14/2006

capable. However fervently we might wish it, none of these three is likely to give up its nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons option outside of a global or regional arms control framework. Our traditional strategy -- of treating such states as outsiders -- is no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold.

Which brings us to a current controversy -- the recent agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh regarding the exchange of nuclear technology between the United States and India.

Some insist that the deal will primarily enable India to divert more uranium to produce more weapons -- that it rewards India for having developed nuclear weapons and legitimizes its status as a nuclear weapons state. By contrast, some in India argue that it will bring the downfall of India's nuclear weapons program, because of new restrictions on moving equipment and expertise between civilian and military facilities.

Clearly, this is a complex issue on which intelligent people can disagree. Ultimately, perhaps, it comes down to a balance of judgment. But to this array of opinions, I would offer the following:

First, under the NPT, there is no such thing as a "legitimate" or "illegitimate" nuclear weapons state. The fact that five states are recognized in the treaty as holders of nuclear weapons was regarded as a matter of transition; the treaty does not in any sense confer permanent status on those states as weapons holders. Moreover, the U.S.-India deal is neutral on this point -- it does not add to or detract from India's nuclear weapons program, nor does it confer any "status," legal or otherwise, on India as a possessor of nuclear weapons. India has never joined the NPT; it has therefore not violated any legal commitment, and it has never encouraged nuclear weapons proliferation.

Also, it is important to consider the implications of denying this exchange of peaceful nuclear technology. As a country with one-sixth of the world's population, India has an enormous appetite for energy -- and the fastest-growing civilian nuclear energy program in the world. With this anticipated growth, it is important that India have access to the safest and most advanced technology.

India clearly enjoys close cooperation with the United States and many other countries in a number of areas of technology and security. It is treated as a valued partner, a trusted contributor to international peace and security. It is difficult to understand the logic that would continue to carve out civil nuclear energy as the single area for noncooperation.

Under the agreement, India commits to following the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of states that regulates access to nuclear material and technology. India would bring its civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards. India has voiced its support for the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The strong support of both India and the United States -- as well as all other nuclear weapons states -- is sorely needed to make this treaty a reality.

The U.S.-India agreement is a creative break with the past that, handled properly, will be a first step forward for both India and the international community. India will get safe and modern technology to help lift more than 500 million people from poverty, and it will be part of the international effort to combat nuclear terrorism and rid our world of nuclear weapons.

As we face the future, other strategies must be found to enlist Pakistan and Israel as partners in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Whatever form those solutions take, they will need to address not only nuclear weapons but also the much broader range of security concerns facing each country. No one ever said controlling nuclear weapons was going to be easy. It will take courage and tenacity in large

doses, a great deal more outside-of-the-box thinking, and a sense of realism. And it will be worth the effort.

The writer is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He and the agency won the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.

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international nonproliferation regime. The International Atomic Energy Agency would gain access to India's civilian nuclear program that it currently does not have. Recognizing this, the IAEA's director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, has joined leaders in France and the United Kingdom to welcome our agreement. He called it "a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety."

Our agreement with India is unique because India is unique. India is a democracy, where citizens of many ethnicities and faiths cooperate in peace and freedom. India's civilian government functions transparently and accountably. It is fighting terrorism and extremism, and it has a 30-year record of responsible behavior on nonproliferation matters.

Aspiring proliferators such as North Korea or Iran may seek to draw connections between themselves and India, but their rhetoric rings hollow. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism that has violated its own commitments and is defying the international community's efforts to contain its nuclear ambitions. North Korea, the least transparent country in the world, threatens its neighbors and proliferates weapons. There is simply no comparison between the Iranian or North Korean regimes and India.

The world has known for some time that India has nuclear weapons, but our agreement will not enhance its capacity to make more. Under the agreement, India will separate its civilian and military nuclear programs for the first time. It will place two-thirds of its existing reactors, and about 65 percent of its generating power, under permanent safeguards, with international verification -- again, for the first time ever. This same transparent oversight will also apply to all of India's future civilian reactors, both thermal and breeder. Our sale of nuclear material or technology would benefit only India's civilian reactors, which would also be eligible for international cooperation from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Second, our agreement is good for energy security. India, a nation of a billion people, has a massive appetite for energy to meet its growing development needs. Civilian nuclear energy will make it less reliant on unstable sources of oil and gas. Our agreement will allow India to contribute to and share in the advanced technology that is needed for the future development of nuclear energy. And because nuclear energy is cleaner than fossil fuels, our agreement will also benefit the environment. A threefold increase in Indian nuclear capacity by 2015 would reduce India's projected annual CO₂ emissions by more than 170 million tons, about the current total emissions of the Netherlands.

Third, our agreement is good for American jobs, because it opens the door to civilian nuclear trade and cooperation between our nations. India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012. If U.S. companies win just two of those reactor contracts, it will mean thousands of new jobs for American workers. We plan to expand our civilian nuclear partnership to research and development, drawing on India's technological expertise to promote a global renaissance in safe and clean nuclear power.

Finally, our civilian nuclear agreement is an essential step toward our goal of transforming America's partnership with India. For too long during the past century, differences over domestic policies and international purposes kept India and the United States estranged. But with the end of the Cold War, the rise of the global economy and changing demographics in both of our countries, new opportunities have arisen for a partnership between our two great democracies. As President Bush said in New Delhi this month, "India in the 21st century is a natural partner of the United States because we are brothers in the cause of human liberty."

Under the president's leadership, we are beginning to realize the full promise of our relationship with India, in fields as diverse as agriculture and health, commerce and defense, science and technology, and education and exchange. Over 65,000 Americans live in India, attracted by its growing economy and the richness of its culture. There are more than 2 million people of Indian origin in the United States, many

of whom are U.S. citizens. More Indians study in our universities than students from any other nation. Our civilian nuclear agreement is a critical contribution to the stronger, more enduring partnership that we are building.

We are consulting extensively with Congress as we seek to amend the laws needed to implement the agreement. This is an opportunity that should not be missed. Looking back decades from now, we will recognize this moment as the time when America invested the strategic capital needed to recast its relationship with India. As the nations of Asia continue their dramatic rise in a rapidly changing region, a thriving, democratic India will be a pillar of Asia's progress, shaping its development for decades. This is a future that America wants to share with India, and there is not a moment to lose.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/12/AR2006031200978.html>

Rethinking Nuclear Safeguards

The Washington Post

By MOHAMED ELBARADEI

Wednesday, June 14, 2006

In regard to nuclear proliferation and arms control, the fundamental problem is clear: Either we begin finding creative, outside-the-box solutions or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete.

For this reason, I have been calling for new approaches in a number of areas. First, a recommitment to disarmament -- a move away from national security strategies that rely on nuclear weapons, which serve as a constant stimulus for other nations to acquire them. Second, tightened controls on the proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. By bringing multinational control to any operation that enriches uranium or separates plutonium, we can lower the risk of these materials being diverted to weapons. A parallel step would be to create a mechanism to ensure a reliable supply of reactor fuel to bona fide users, including a fuel bank under control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The third area has been more problematic: how to deal creatively with the three countries that remain outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Pakistan and India, both holders of nuclear arsenals, and Israel, which maintains an official policy of ambiguity but is believed to be nuclear-weapons-capable. However fervently we might wish it, none of these three is likely to give up its nuclear weapons or the nuclear weapons option outside of a global or regional arms control framework. Our traditional strategy -- of treating such states as outsiders -- is no longer a realistic method of bringing these last few countries into the fold.

Which brings us to a current controversy -- the recent agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh regarding the exchange of nuclear technology between the United States and India.

Some insist that the deal will primarily enable India to divert more uranium to produce more weapons -- that it rewards India for having developed nuclear weapons and legitimizes its status as a nuclear weapons state. By contrast, some in India argue that it will bring the downfall of India's nuclear weapons program, because of new restrictions on moving equipment and expertise between civilian and military facilities.

Clearly, this is a complex issue on which intelligent people can disagree. Ultimately, perhaps, it comes down to a balance of judgment. But to this array of opinions, I would offer the following:

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Also, it is important to consider the implications of denying this exchange of peaceful nuclear technology. As a country with one-sixth of the world's population, India has an enormous appetite for energy -- and the fastest-growing civilian nuclear energy program in the world. With this anticipated growth, it is important that India have access to the safest and most advanced technology.

India clearly enjoys close cooperation with the United States and many other countries in a number of areas of technology and security. It is treated as a valued partner, a trusted contributor to international peace and security. It is difficult to understand the logic that would continue to carve out civil nuclear energy as the single area for noncooperation.

Under the agreement, India commits to following the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of states that regulates access to nuclear material and technology. India would bring its civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards. India has voiced its support for the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. The strong support of both India and the United States -- as well as all other nuclear weapons states -- is sorely needed to make this treaty a reality.

The U.S.-India agreement is a creative break with the past that, handled properly, will be a first step forward for both India and the international community. India will get safe and modern technology to help lift more than 500 million people from poverty, and it will be part of the international effort to combat nuclear terrorism and rid our world of nuclear weapons.

As we face the future, other strategies must be found to enlist Pakistan and Israel as partners in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Whatever form those solutions take, they will need to address not only nuclear weapons but also the much broader range of security concerns facing each country. No one ever said controlling nuclear weapons was going to be easy. It will take courage and tenacity in large doses, a great deal more outside-of-the-box thinking, and a sense of realism. And it will be worth the effort.

The writer is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He and the agency won the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/13/AR2006061301498.html>

For a safer World

The Washington Times

William S. Cohen

Published June 21, 2006

The U.S.-India agreement on civil nuclear cooperation is an important manifestation of the growing strategic partnership between our two great democracies. Unfortunately, with less than 50 legislative days before Congress adjourns to pursue elections, the implementing legislation for this landmark agreement still languishes in committee. Time is running out. If not enacted before the congressional summer recess, the chances for ultimate passage will decrease precipitously.

The 2006 midterm elections promise to be some of the closest and most partisan on record. In such an atmosphere, prospects for getting Congress to concentrate on this needed legislation, even after elections, are dim indeed.

A chief delaying tactics by congressional opponents has been to seize on the argument that U.S. cooperation with India on civil nuclear matters will somehow make the world less safe from the scourge of nuclear terror. The reality is just the opposite. For 32 years, the United States has attempted to punish India for failing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty with no discernable affect on Indian policy. Today, we have the opportunity to formulate a new policy, one that can secure India's cooperative efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, strengthen democratic values and global security.

Some congressional opponents insist action in favor of implementation would remove a constraint on India's strategic weapons program. Their argument is that India has so little natural uranium that providing fissile material for civilian purposes will free up uranium for the Indians to make more nuclear weapons than they might otherwise. While simply put, the argument is simply wrong.

As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice correctly noted during her appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "[We] do not believe that the absence of uranium is really the constraint on the [Indian] nuclear weapons program." India has more than enough uranium both to support its weapons program and its present civil nuclear power program. India could even significantly expand its weapons program and make modest additions to its nuclear power program with its present uranium supplies.

It takes relatively little uranium to make a nuclear weapon, and India's present nuclear power program is so modest it could be expanded within India's existing supplies. As Dr. Ashley J. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes in a soon-to-be-published paper, the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency estimate India's reasonably assured assets of uranium at no less than 40,980 tons. A single 20 kiloton nuclear weapon only requires about 6 kilograms of plutonium, which can be produced using little more than 6 metric tons of uranium in a research reactor. India's entire present nuclear weapons program plus its power program plus its new reactors presently being built would require about 650 tons of uranium per year.

Thus, these Indian assets of uranium alone could continue India's program for more than 60 years, and India has reasonable prospects for even more. India has all the natural uranium it needs to produce as many nuclear weapons as it wishes plus an enhanced version of its present nuclear power for the foreseeable future.

The truth is India, in considering its strategic interest, will act in a manner consistent with its national security, with or without this agreement. It is unlikely to agree to limit its fissile material production unilaterally.

Should the U.S. Congress reject this agreement, it might make India's satisfaction of its growing energy needs more difficult, and force it to rely more on fossil fuels, thereby increasing harmful greenhouse gases. However, with this agreement India will work with the United States and others, in the words of Director General of the IAEA and Nobel Prize winner Mohammed ElBaradei, "to consolidate the nuclear nonproliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety."

William S. Cohen is chairman and chief executive officer of the Cohen Group and is a former defense secretary and U.S. senator from Maine.

<http://washingtontimes.com/commentary/20060620-083850-5948r.htm>

A Nuclear Reality Check

America goes around the world arguing that a few more warheads would be dangerous and immoral—while it has 12,000 of its own.

By Fareed Zakaria

Newsweek

April 9, 2006

April 17, 2006 issue - Many of the Bush administration's critics argue, with some merit, that it has often pursued a foreign policy based on ideology and fantasy, not the realities of the world. But now the critics are lost in their own reveries. They fantasize that the United States and India will sign a nuclear agreement in which the latter renounces its nuclear weapons. They criticize the Bush administration's proposed deal with India because it does no such thing. (Instead, India commits to placing 14 of its 22 reactors under permanent inspections, and retains eight for its weapons program.) But this is a dream, not a deal. India has spent 32 years under American sanctions without budging—even when it was a much poorer country than it is today—and it would happily spend 32 more before it signed such a deal. The choice we face is the proposed deal with India or no deal at all.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime has always tempered idealism with a healthy dose of realism. After all, the United States goes around the world telling countries that a few more nuclear warheads are dangerous and immoral—while it has 12,000 nukes of its own. The nonproliferation treaty arbitrarily determined that countries that had nuclear weapons in 1968 were legitimate nuclear-weapons states, and that all latecomers were outlaws. (It was the mother of all grandfather clauses.) India is the most important country, and only potential global power, that lies outside the nonproliferation system. Bringing it in is crucial to the system's survival. That's why Mohamed ElBaradei, the man charged with protecting and enforcing global nonproliferation, has been a staunch supporter of the agreement.

This deal, shorn of all the jargon, comes down to something quite simple: should we treat India like China, or like North Korea? If the former, then we have to accept the reality that it is a nuclear power and help make its program as safe and secure as possible. If the latter, then we'll never stop trying to reverse India's weapons program.

Actually, even if this deal goes through, India will have second-class status compared with China, Russia and the other major nuclear powers. In all those countries, not one reactor is under any inspection regime whatsoever, yet India would place at least two thirds of its program under the eye of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The inequity with China is particularly galling to New Delhi. China has a long history of abetting nuclear proliferation, most clearly through Pakistan. Yet the United States has an arrangement to share civilian nuclear technology with Beijing. India, meanwhile, is a democratic, transparent country with a perfect record of nonproliferation. Yet it has been denied such cooperation for the past 32 years.

There are some who are willing, grudgingly, to give up their full-blown fantasy and settle for a minor one—a deal in which India would agree to cap its production of fissile material. Jimmy Carter expressed this view in a recent article. But look at a map. India is bordered by China and Pakistan, both nuclear-weapons states, neither of which has agreed to a mandatory cap. (China appears to have stopped producing plutonium, as have the other major powers, but this is a voluntary decision, made largely because it's awash in fissile material.) For India to accept a mandatory cap is to adopt a one-sided nuclear freeze. Would the United States do that? India has declared a commitment to support such a cap when it is accepted by all nuclear states, which is what we should push for.

There is a broader strategic issue for the United States. It has been American policy for decades to oppose the rise of a single hegemonic power in either Europe or Asia. If India were forced to halt its plutonium production, the result would be that China would become the dominant nuclear power in Asia. Why is this in American interests? Should we not prefer a circumstance where there is some balance between the major powers on that vast continent?

The agreement is also a crucial step forward in tackling the problem of global energy. If India and China keep guzzling gas as they grow, any and all Western efforts at energy conservation are pointless. We have to find a way that these two rising giants can satisfy their energy needs, while also reducing their dependence on fossil fuels. Civilian nuclear power can help fill the gap. Indian technology is actually the best in the world in this area because it largely solves the problem of nuclear waste. So while India has much to learn from the United States, the relationship will not be entirely one-sided.

A more workable nonproliferation regime, a more stable strategic balance in Asia—and it's even good for the environment. This is a reality that's better than most fantasies.

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12225698/site/newsweek/>

It makes sense to end India's nuclear isolation

John B. Ritch

International Herald Tribune

Thursday, April 6, 2006

London- President George W. Bush has taken a momentous step in shelving a U.S. policy that for three decades cast India as a nuclear pariah- state and isolated the world's largest democracy from nuclear commerce, even for the peaceful purpose of generating electricity.

In Washington a fierce debate has erupted over the impact on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The U.S.-India deal conforms to the treaty by ensuring that nuclear commerce remains in the civil realm. But critics say it jeopardizes the treaty by legitimizing India's nuclear deterrent. Supporters counter that India's weapon is a long-standing fact, that India has used nuclear technology responsibly and that it is time to close ranks with a democracy.

Before the Bush initiative, two truths coexisted uneasily. First, the nonproliferation regime is one of history's great diplomatic achievements. Since its inception in 1970, the treaty has kept the number of nuclear-armed nations under 10.

Episodes of non-compliance have shown the treaty's value. After the first Gulf War revealed Iraq's covert nuclear efforts, the treaty regime gained strength as the International Atomic Energy Agency acquired new detection capabilities and broader authority for its inspectors. Treaty inspections "caught" both North Korea and Iran, and have spurred collective diplomacy against these violations.

A second, less convenient truth is that the treaty was, from the outset, unfair to India as a great nation. The treaty drew a line in time, recognizing only the UN Security Council's five permanent members as "nuclear-weapon states." Thus, when India became the world's sixth nuclear power in 1974, it faced Hobson's choice: Disarm or remain outside the treaty.

For reasons of principle and strategic interest India remained outside, declaring that it would eliminate

its small deterrent as soon as the five favored "weapon states" fulfilled a treaty pledge to dismantle their own much larger nuclear arsenals.

Indians went on, for three decades, to become proud developers and careful custodians of their own sophisticated nuclear technologies. To supply power for economic growth, India now plans to build hundreds of reactors by mid-century, even without the new agreement.

The Bush initiative would accept India's reality. Critics complain that the accord leaves India's military program "unconstrained." Advocates counter that India's civil power reactors will fall under inspection safeguards.

This debate is sterile. Inspections on India's civil facilities cannot affect its military program. But neither will civil nuclear trade with India spur an Asian arms race. India's leaders have no motive to abandon India's long-standing policy of maintaining minimal nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan's smaller nuclear force and China's larger one.

Although legal under the nonproliferation treaty, the deal will require change in a U.S. law enacted in 1978 that made treaty membership a condition of nuclear trade. In 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group of nations embraced the same coercive approach. Now these countries are set to follow the U.S. lead, with only China expressing resistance.

The new policy would revert - in the unique case of India - to the basic treaty requirement of confining nuclear trade to the civil realm. It would also welcome India as a partner in world nuclear trade controls and collaborative projects to develop nuclear technology.

Some say that ending India's nuclear isolation sends a dangerous message to potential proliferators. This charge does not withstand analysis. How will the ambitions of Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan be inflamed by the principle now being affirmed?

The principle is this: In sensitive nuclear technology, we will trade legally - and with nations that have earned the world's trust. As a practical matter, no nation appears likely to "proliferate" because India is allowed civil nuclear commerce.

Thus has the new policy been endorsed by Hans Blix and Mohamed Elbaradei, the IAEA leaders entrusted over the last quarter century to oversee the nonproliferation regime.

Nuclear cooperation with India offers some economic opportunity - and potentially enormous environmental value. India has recognized the urgency of a worldwide clean-energy revolution if humankind is to avoid unleashing devastating climate change.

The U.S.-India deal promises a partnership between the two largest democracies to deliver this environmental benefit - within India and to a wider world - on a scale that can make a difference.

With a strong legal, strategic and environmental rationale, this is a Bush initiative that has gained a broad coalition of support abroad.

John B. Ritch, U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the Clinton administration, is the director general of the World Nuclear Association and president of the World Nuclear University.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/05/opinion/edritch.php>

Nuclear power for India is good for us all

International Herald Tribune

March 17, 2006

By David G. Victor, PhD

Stanford, California - If the deal to supply India with nuclear technologies goes through, future generations may remember it for quite different reasons than the debate over nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear power emits no carbon dioxide, the leading cause of global warming. And India, like most developing countries, has not been anxious to spend money to control its emissions of this and other so-called greenhouse gases.

India is embracing nuclear power for other reasons - because it can help the country solve its chronic failure to supply the electricity needed for a burgeoning economy. But in effect, the deal would marry their interest in power with ours in protecting the planet.

India is growing rapidly. In recent years its economy has swelled at more than 7 percent per year, and many analysts believe it is poised to grow even faster in the coming decade.

The economic growth is feeding a voracious appetite for electricity that India's bankrupt utilities are unable to satisfy. Blackouts are commonplace. Farmers, who account for about two-fifths of all the power consumed, can barely rely on getting power for half of every day. In industrial zones, the lifeblood of India's vibrant economy, unstable power supplies are such trouble that the biggest companies usually build their own power plants.

So most analysts expect that the demand for electricity will rise at about 10 percent a year. (For comparison, U.S. power demand notches up at just 2 percent annually.)

Over the past decade, about one third of India's new power supplies came from natural gas and hydro electricity. Both those sources have been good news for global warming - natural gas is the least carbon-intensive of all the fossil fuels, and most of India's hydroelectric dams probably emit almost no greenhouse gases.

However, the bloom is coming off those greenhouse-friendly roses. New supplies of natural gas cost about twice what Indians are used to paying, and environmental objections are likely to scupper the government's grand plans for new hydro dams.

That leaves coal - the most carbon-intensive of all fossil fuels. Already more than half of India's new power supplies come from coal, and that could grow rapidly.

Traditionally, the coal sector was plagued by inefficiencies. State coal mines were notoriously dangerous and inefficient. Coal-fired plants in western provinces, far from the coal fields and vulnerable to the dysfunctional rail network, often came within days of shutting operations due to lack of coal.

All that is changing. Private and highly efficient coal mines are grabbing growing shares of the coal market. Upgrades to the nation's high-tension power grid is making it feasible to generate electricity with new plants installed right at the coal mines.

These improvements make coal the fuel to beat.

So the deal struck with President George W. Bush matters. At the moment, India has just 3 gigawatts of nuclear plants connected to the grid. Government planners envision that nuclear supply will grow to 30 GW over the next generation, but that will remain a fantasy without access to advanced nuclear technologies and, especially, nuclear fuels - such as those offered under the deal with the Bush administration.

By 2020, even after discounting for the government's normal exuberance in its forecasts, a fresh start for nuclear power could increase nuclear generating capacity nearly ten-fold.

By displacing coal, that would avoid about 130 million tons of carbon dioxide per year (for comparison, the full range of emission cuts planned by the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol will total just 200 million tons per year).

The effort, if successful, would eclipse the scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Clean Development Mechanism, that was designed to reward developing countries that implement projects to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. The largest 100 of these CDM projects, in total, won't reduce emissions as much as a successful effort to help India embrace safe nuclear power.

The benefits in slowing global warming are not enough to make the deal a winner. Care is needed to tame the risks of proliferation, especially those connected from India's system of breeder reactors that make more weapons-capable fuel than they consume. And complementary efforts, led by Indians, are needed to fix the trouble in India's electricity sector that have so far discouraged private investors.

None of this will be easy. There are no silver bullets in cooling the greenhouse.

What is important is that the deal is not just a one-off venture, as the administration's backers, on the defensive, have suggested. It could frame a new approach to technology sharing and managing a more proliferation proof fuel cycle that, in turn, will multiply the benefits of a cooler climate.

Coal-rich China is among the many other countries that would welcome more nuclear power and whose emissions of carbon dioxide are growing fast - even faster than India's.

Quite accidentally, it seems, the Bush administration has stumbled on part of an effective strategy to slow global warming. Now it should marry that clever scheme overseas with an effective plan here at home.

<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/opinion/edvictor.php>

2006/03/16 19:17:36
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/opinion/edvictor.php

Barbour Griffith & Rogers International

From: Barbour Griffith & Rogers International

Sent: Monday, June 26, 2006 12:31 PM

Subject: Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal

Dear Colleague,

I would like to bring your attention to the June 2006 Carnegie Endowment Report by Ashley J. Tellis, "Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal." Please see the summary below. The link for the full report can be found at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443>.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Parasiliti

Andrew Parasiliti, Ph.D.
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Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation of the Government of India. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

FULL SUMMARY BY ASHLEY J. TELLIS

Among the most serious criticisms leveled at the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation initiative agreed to by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is that it would enable India to rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal. This criticism rests upon two crucial assumptions: that New Delhi in fact seeks the largest nuclear weapons inventory its capacity and resources permit; and, the Indian desire for a larger nuclear arsenal has been stymied thus far by a shortage of natural uranium.

A forthcoming study, Atoms for War?: U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal, by Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that both these assumptions are deeply flawed. To begin with, the study concludes that India is currently separating about 24-40 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually, far less than it has the capability to produce. This evidence, which suggests that the Government of India is in no hurry to build the biggest nuclear stockpile it could construct based on material factors alone, undermines the assumption that India wishes to build the biggest nuclear arsenal it possibly can.

Further, India's capacity to produce a huge nuclear arsenal is not affected by prospective U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation. A few facts underscore this conclusion clearly. India is widely acknowledged to possess reserves of 78,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU). The forthcoming Carnegie

6/26/2006

study concludes that the total inventory of natural uranium required to sustain all the reactors associated with the current power program (both those operational and those under construction) and the weapons program over the entire notional lifetime of these plants runs into some 14,640-14,790 MTU—or, in other words, requirements that are well within even the most conservative valuations of India's reasonably assured uranium reserves. If the eight reactors that India has retained outside of safeguards were to allocate 1/4 of their cores for the production of weapons-grade materials—the most realistic possibility for the technical reasons discussed at length in the forthcoming report—the total amount of natural uranium required to run these facilities for the remaining duration of their notional lives would be somewhere between 19,965-29,124 MTU. If this total is added to the entire natural uranium fuel load required to run India's two research reactors dedicated to the production of weapons-grade plutonium over their entire life cycle—some 938-1088 MTU—the total amount of natural uranium required by India's dedicated weapons reactors and all its unsafeguarded PHWRs does not exceed 20,903-30,212 MTU over the remaining lifetime of these facilities. Operating India's eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in this way would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135-13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023-2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal.

The research in this report concludes that the total amount of natural uranium required to fuel all Indian reactors, on the assumption that eight of them would be used for producing weapons-grade materials in 1/4 of their cores, would be crudely speaking somewhere between 26,381 and 35,690 MTU over the remaining lives of all these facilities—a requirement that lies well within India's assured uranium reserves howsoever these are disaggregated. In sum, India has the indigenous reserves of natural uranium necessary to undergird the largest possible nuclear arsenal it may desire and, consequently, the U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear cooperation initiative will not materially contribute towards New Delhi's strategic capacities in any consequential way either directly or by freeing up its internal resources.

This conclusion notwithstanding, India does face a current shortage of natural uranium caused by constrictions in its mining and milling capacity. This deficit, however, represents a transient problem that is in the process of being redressed. It should be borne in mind that the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement proposed by President Bush does not in any way affect the Government of India's ability to upgrade its uranium mines and milling facilities—as it is currently doing. All this implies that the shortages of uranium fuel experienced by India presently are a near-term aberration, and not an enduring limitation resulting from the dearth of physical resources. As such, they do not offer a viable basis either for Congress to extort any concessions from India in regards to its weapons program or for supporting the petty canard that imported natural uranium will lead to a substantial increase in the size of India's nuclear weapons program.

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is co-author of *Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty*.

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Westerman, Stefanie

From: Westerman, Stefanie on behalf of Barbour Griffith & Rogers International
Sent: Thursday, September 07, 2006 11:47 AM
Subject: "A Nuclear Deal with India"

Dear Colleague,

I would like to bring to your attention an editorial "A Nuclear Deal with India," published Tuesday, September 5, 2006 in *The Washington Times*.

Sincerely yours,

Andrew Parasiliti

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A Nuclear Deal with India
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
SECTION: EDITORIALS; Pg. A20

Forging a stronger relationship with India is an unambiguously advantageous and astute aspect of Bush administration foreign policy. But solidifying the relationship now depends on securing congressional approval for the civil nuclear deal, what President Bush called a "necessary" and "historic" agreement that has become the centerpiece of his Indian diplomacy.

The House approved the deal 359-68 at the end of July. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 16-3 in favor of the accord in June, and it's important that the bill be taken up in the Senate, where, by most accounts, it has enough support to pass. The agreement would boost India's imports, by some estimates in excess of \$50 billion, and much of that business would go to U.S. firms. U.S. exports to India doubled between 2002 and 2005 (to \$8 billion), and U.S. companies are hoping that India's economy and its imports will continue to grow. To sustain that growth, India needs to be able to meet its increasing energy needs, and the United States should prefer that India rely on nuclear power as a clean alternative to coal power plants.

9/7/2006

Criticism of the deal is centered on the assertion that the accord rewards India, which is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, at the same time that the United States is trying to punish such nuclear rogue states as Iran and North Korea. Unlike those two countries, however, India has an exemplary nonproliferation record. The agreement brings India more into the nuclear mainstream, where it belongs.

The deal will bring India's civil nuclear program under international safeguards, which is why the agreement won the endorsement of director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei. All future reactors, along with two-thirds of India's current reactors, will be brought into compliance with international standards. In a practical sense, bringing some Indian nuclear reactors under international safeguards is preferable to having no Indian nuclear reactors in compliance with those safeguards.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said recently that his country would accept no changes to the original agreement. Senate discussion of the bill should be minimally influenced by Mr. Singh's bluster. Certain political realities will prevail: Demanding India sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, for instance, is a nonstarter so long as neighboring Pakistan remains uncommitted to it. But Mr. Singh should be expected to secure approval for minor changes to a deal that, overall, clearly benefits India as well as the United States.

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Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430

Preamble:

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*Addendum to the Supplemental Statement pursuant to Section 2 of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938, as amended.*

Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430

Questions 11 & 12:

Preamble:

National Dialogue Party:

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the National Dialogue Party. All informational materials either distributed or facilitated by Registrant on behalf of Principal are attached.

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CRM/REGISTRATION UNIT

DATE OF CONTACT	U.S. GOVT. OFFICIAL CONTACTED	MANNER IN WHICH CONTACT WAS MADE	SUBJECT MATTER
May 30	Meghan O'Sullivan, National Security Council	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
May 30	Congressman Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
May 31	Dr. Robert Danin, Department of State	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
May 31	Brian McCormack, Office of the Public Liaison	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
June 1	Dr. Grummon, Department of State	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
June 1	Erica Barks-Ruggles, Department of State	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
June 1	Dr. Krasner, Department of State	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
June 10	Toby Bradley, Office of the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs	Dinner	National Dialogue Party
June 10	Scott Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs	Dinner	National Dialogue Party
June 27	Robert Karem, Office of the Vice President	Email	National Dialogue Party
June 29	Robert Karem, Office of the Vice President	Telephone Call	National Dialogue Party
July 10	Congressman Charles Boustany, (R-LA)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
July 11	Congressman Ray LaHood (R-IL)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
July 11	Congressman Nick Rahall (D-WV)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
July 11	Congressman Gene Taylor (D, MS)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party

July 11	Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 7	Patrick Garvey, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	National Dialogue Party
September 12	Meghan O'Sullivan, National Security Council	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 12	Senator Trent Lott, (R-MS)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 13	Congressman Charles Boustany, (R-LA)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 14	Senator John Sununu, (R-NH)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 14	Ambassador Jim Jeffrey, Department of State	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
September 14	Senator Thad Cochran, (R-MS)	Office Meeting	National Dialogue Party
December 1	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	National Dialogue Party

Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC – Registration Number 5430

Preamble:

During the six-month reporting period, the Registrant engaged in the following political activities (attached). The Registrant did not arrange, sponsor or deliver any speeches, lecture or radio and television broadcasts on behalf of the Serbia. All informational materials either distributed or facilitated by Registrant on behalf of Principal are attached.

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DATE OF CONTACT	U.S. GOVT. OFFICIAL CONTACTED	MANNER IN WHICH CONTACT WAS MADE	SUBJECT MATTER
August 2	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
August 3	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
August 3	Rosemary DiCarlo and Dan Fried, Department of State	Meeting	Serbia
August 17	Jeannie Siskovic, Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)	Office Meeting	Serbia
August 17	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Office Meeting	Serbia
September 5	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 5	Glenn Powell, Office of Senator Inhofe	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 6	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 6	Rosemary DiCarlo, Department of State	Office Meeting	Serbia
September 8	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 8	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 18	Jeannie Siskovic, Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 20	Glenn Powell, Office of Senator Inhofe	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 20	Patrick Prisco, House International Relations Committee	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 21	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
September 25	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Serbia

September 25	Dan Fried, Department of State	Telephone Call	Serbia
October 18	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Serbia
October 20	Luis Jimenez, Office of Congressman Emanuel	Telephone Call	Serbia
October 20	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
October 20	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Serbia
October 20	Jeannie Siskovic, Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)	Telephone Call	Serbia
October 20	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Serbia
October 25	House and Senate Foreign Relations Legislative Assistants	Email	Serbia
November 1	Colleen Gilbert, Office of Congressman Burton	Telephone Call	Serbia
November 20	Ambassador Frank Wisner, State Department	Telephone Call	Serbia
December 4-8	Weekly Standard New Republic CQ Weekly National Journal Roll Call The Hill Washington Post Washington Times Wall Street Journal/DC CQ Today National Journal AM Washington Jewish Week	Paid Advertisements by Government of Serbia (Available to review upon request.)	Serbia
December 6	Bert Braun, National Security Council	Telephone Call	Serbia
December 12	Ken Myers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Telephone Call	Serbia

Balkan Update

From: Balkan Update [balkanupdate@balkanupdate.net]
Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2006 1:02 PM
Subject: Balkan Update: Testimony on Serbia by Ambassador Alexander Rondos
Attachments: Alexander Rondos Testimony.pdf

Please find attached testimony by Ambassador Alexander G. Rondos before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats hearing on "Serbia: Current Issues and Future Direction," September 20, 2006.

The link for the testimony can be found at
http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/ron092006.pdf

Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation and dissemination of information on behalf of the Government of Serbia. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

2006 OCT 17 11:09:27
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**Testimony to the House of Representatives,
International Relations Committee,
Sub Committee on Europe and Emerging Threats
September 20, 2006**

by

**Alexander G. Rondos
Former Ambassador of Greece and International Board Member
Project on Transitional Democracies**

2007 OCT 19 11 00 37
OCS/IR&E/COMM/INT/EXT

Mr. Chairman:

My name is Alexander Rondos. I am a former Ambassador of Greece and have been closely involved with Balkan politics for the last eight years. I was also a member of the International Commission on the Balkans. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to testify on Serbia before the Sub-Committee on Europe and Emerging Threats.

Your hearing is timely. The course of political events in Serbia in the next year can have a decisive effect both for the future of the country and for the stability of the Balkans.

- Serbia must have elections in the next twelve months. It will certainly have them sooner. In these elections there will be a stark choice between those who want to build on and complete the work of market and democratic reform that began in 2000 with the overthrow of Milosevic and those who were collaborators of Milosevic whose intentions are still shrouded in nationalist rhetoric.
- Serbia will either keep a coalition of political forces that will continue the push towards transparent market reform and prepare the country for membership of the European Union, or it will give way to those forces that want to restore the privileges they enjoyed during the years of isolation under Milosevic.
- Serbia will have been given serious cause for optimism by the European Union that its candidacy might be possible or it will be left as a European

afterthought, confirming to some in Serbia that the West is not to be taken seriously.

- Serbia will be confronted by the decision on the status of Kosovo. If that decision is taken by the international community before elections, it will be very difficult to hold off the assault of those in Serbia who say that the democratic forces simply gave in and surrendered Serbia's Jerusalem.

We therefore have a choice, as members of the international community, to decide to take the strategic high road and argue that the primary goal is to secure Serbian democracy, ensure security in Kosovo and stability in a still fragile region. The cornerstone of Serbian democracy is the guarantor for satisfactory settlement on Kosovo and for stability in the region. Such a roadmap for Balkan success would culminate with the European Union giving assurances that Serbia would become a candidate of the Union, perhaps in late 2007. If we believe that this is the path to follow, then we have to be very careful about how these external issues like Kosovo will influence the choices Serbs make in their elections.

The alternative is to argue that the Serbs mortgaged themselves morally with Milosevic and that they have not paid their mortgage off. This means going ahead immediately with some solution on Kosovo and allowing the European Union to procrastinate and prevaricate over Serbia's future role in Europe. As far elections are concerned, Serbs would be informed that they are welcome to have them whenever they want and the international community will follow its own timetable for Kosovo.

I happen to believe that the first option is the wise way to go. I fear that I am in a minority and that the fate of Serbia may be decided by external influences that are guided by indifference, impatience and perhaps a touch of vindictiveness.

I chose to be with you to ring an alarm bell. I believe that it is in our collective strategic interests to do what is necessary to help the Serbian nation complete the work it has begun in building a thriving democracy. When you have friends who want to stand up and be counted with you as part of the family of democratic nations, then it is also our obligation to stand by them. If we do not, then surely we have no reason to complain when they turn their backs on us and dismiss us as moral and political gadflies. We have an opportunity to be serious in our efforts to work with Serbia and I believe that Serbia is ready to reciprocate. Above all, a little vision could take us a long way to success.

The domestic political choice in Serbia is between the parties that struggled to bring democracy to Serbia and those that collaborated with Milosevic. It is a choice between a Western orientation of the economic, political and defence alliance, and, one that is much more suspicious of the benefits that such alliances can bring. It will be a choice between one group of parties that have yet to make themselves over from the past and those that are shaping to be the forces for the future. It will be a choice between a more competitive, modernised economy and one that – in the absence of a clear opposition platform – will try to reward those who feel they have been excluded from the benefits of the last few years of democratic life and economic growth.

These choices are common to most societies in transition from the communist period. I would like to focus on the variables that are uniquely Serbian and often easily misunderstood outside of Serbia.

I would like to reduce these briefly to the following:

- a. The shape of Serbia's economy;
- b. The shape of democratic life;
- c. The shape of Serbia's territory
- d. Serbia's place in the world.

Given that Serbia was economically isolated by sanctions for close to a decade, it is remarkable how the country has succeeded in bring back some balance to economic life. Monetary stability is in stark contrast to the spiraling inflation of the 1990s. The banking sector is expanding impressively. Recent privatizations have added new revenue to the budget and turned almost 75 percent of the former socially owned enterprises into private ownership. Foreign investors have been important contributors to the process. The macro-economic indicators, in short, are impressive. Now Serbia faces the task of building a thriving economy that can expand employment opportunities while lifting living standards. In my view, the democratic governments that succeeded the Milosevic era have exercised economic management with considerable wisdom, leaving it in the hands of an impressive group of technocrats who have imposed economic discipline while also disciplining expectations. Continuity is in Serbia's interests.

Democratic life in Serbia is healthy. It does not fit the classic patterns of Left versus Right. The parties that assumed power upon the overthrow of Milosevic are clearly in opposition to those parties, like the Radicals (SRS) and the Socialists (SPS) that collaborated with Milosevic. A victory by the Radical Party would not cripple democracy. The trappings of democratic life will remain. The threat lies elsewhere. We have seen in other parts of the post-communist world, a roll back from the initial gains of democratic politics and a return to power of people who exude nostalgia and a contempt for the spirit of democracy. What is at risk in Serbia is that these parties of the past have yet to demonstrate that they have moved beyond the politics of isolation and resentment. Until they do so, they will infect the political life with the politics of injured national pride and vindictiveness rather than the politics of openness and patriotic self-respect.

This prompts some reflection on the third issue. Either before or after its elections Serbia will be confronted by a very difficult choice regarding the status of Kosovo. I hope that this occurs after the election when a government with a fresh mandate can finalise the negotiations and proceed to the next stage of national life, whatever that may be. Already this year, Serbia has had to handle the separation with Montenegro.

Why is this issue of Kosovo so important and not to be under-estimated nor misunderstood? There are rational arguments and then there are – to the secular westerner – the irrational. Both views command respect. The rational view asks whether Serbia really wants to have a territory 90 percent of which is populated by an Albanian population that is growing demographically at a dramatically high rate. Do these two

people really want to live together? Does Serbia want to have the financial and political responsibility for this Albanian population? Will Albanians participate in the elections in Serbia?

But there is a powerful emotional counterpoint. Kosovo is at the heart of Serbia's historical identity. There may be quite a number of Serbs who do not feel this affinity to Kosovo. There are also many for whom it matters. Serbia is not alone having its Jerusalem as an issue that has deep emotional affinity that translates into politics. I can only think of my own country, Greece where many have the profoundest feeling for what we call our lost motherlands. I will not hide my own sorrow that I am unable to attend liturgy in my own Mother Church, Aghia Sofia, in what is now Istanbul. I am required to pay to visit a museum that was once a mosque after it was desecrated. I can only imagine that for many Jews the issue of Jerusalem has an equally profound pull. These are not issues to be dismissed lightly. In a world where secularism is still so fashionable – and passes as modernism – the risk of misunderstanding the attraction of those unquantifiable symbols that bind a people can be fatal. The desecration of countless Churches in Kosovo since 1999, when the administration of Kosovo passed to the international community, merely adds to the suspicions for many in Serbian politics that part of the national heritage is being deliberately sold away, literally, and that the cradle of its faith is being lost.

Thus, the electoral nightmare for Serbia would be a decision on Kosovo, before the elections, which would possibly result in Serbs fleeing from Kosovo and the belief,

manipulated by many politicians, that the Serbian government had failed to strike an honorable bargain with an international community intent on appeasing the Albanian population and its well publicized threats of violence.

In short, the risk we run is that the electoral fate of those who want to consolidate democracy in Serbia risks being sacrificed to appease who threaten violence.

My fourth point concerns Serbia's place in the world. Were it not for Kosovo, the need to render Ratko Mladic to the Hague and the protracted decision over Montenegro's fate, I firmly believe that Serbia would already be a candidate member of the European Union. The negotiations with the EU are currently stalled over the EU insistence that Serbia demonstrate that it is doing everything to deliver Mladic. The result is that the international community has trapped itself and Serbia. While wanting and needing Serbia the country is being isolated. Little wonder that those who are nostalgic for the past now ask what has been the point of even opening up to the West.

A mere look at the map of Europe and the potential of Serbia should be enough to explain why Serbia should be in the European Union. What I worry about is whether the European Union is willing to engage in the type of strategy that will give Serbia the prospect to show its electorate that the EU is a possibility and not a pipe-dream.

I will conclude by repeating the opening vision. A strategy in which the European Union offers a framework and a future for the Balkans would allow the negotiations on Kosovo

to come to a natural conclusion, when a new democratic government is installed in Belgrade. Interim arrangements can be made to begin the already much delayed implementation of agreements among Serbs and Albanians. This would provide the confidence to allow for security to prevail in Kosovo. With these elements in hand, it is possible to envision a Serbia actively contributing to the stability of the whole region and a Kosovo no longer in an existential limbo, developing the instruments of statehood and law and order, and, progressing towards prosperity.

I hope that we will all have the wisdom to be patient in order to gain a greater good for all..

Thank you.

2017-10-19 14:19:37
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Balkan Update

From: Balkan Update [balkanupdate@balkanupdate.net]

Sent: Friday, October 20, 2006 12:37 PM

Subject: Balkan Update: Human Trafficking in Kosovo

Balkan Update: Human Trafficking in Kosovo

The transnational and internal trafficking and repatriation of victims within Kosovo is an emerging crisis in the Balkans. Kosovo, which has long been a place of transit or destination for victims of trafficking, is now facing a new problem: an increase in trafficking within Kosovo, including children. It is becoming a place of origin for the victims of human trafficking. Unfortunately, local Kosovar governmental institutions and law enforcement authorities have so far not taken the necessary steps to address this critical humanitarian crisis.

Background

According to the U.S. State Department's June 2006 Trafficking in Persons Report, "[Kosovo] is a source, transit, and destination for women and girls trafficked internally and transnationally for the purpose of sexual exploitation." [1] The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has reported a growing trend in trafficking through Kosovo involving both Serbian and Montenegrin victims; a number of these cases involved repeated exploitation of the victims. The IOM estimates that 30-50 percent of females in prostitution in Montenegro are victims of trafficking; of that number, one-half are children.

Kosovo is also a source, transit, and destination point for women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation. In a disturbing trend, the commercial sex trade has continued to shift underground and become increasingly clandestine in Kosovo, with traffickers increasingly using financial incentives to encourage victims to refuse assistance from the United Nations and humanitarian organizations.[2]

Internal trafficking has continued to grow into a more serious problem. Over 80 percent of identified victims assisted are children. The IOM has reported that in 2005, 64 percent of victims in Kosovo were internally trafficked, 15 percent were trafficked into Macedonia, and 13 percent were trafficked into Albania and Italy. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has reported that the foreign victims it has assisted in Kosovo were trafficked primarily from Moldova, Albania, and Bulgaria. A growing number of Albanian and Kosovar victims are also being "re-trafficked" through Kosovo.

During 2003, the UNMIK Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (TPIU) carried out 2,047 raids on suspected prostitution and trafficking premises, resulting in 69 arrests. According to a 2004 UNMIK White Paper on combating Kosovo trafficking, there is a lack of awareness among governments, the judiciary, the community, and potential victims regarding ongoing human trafficking in the region. Pointedly, the report contends that local governmental institutions lack the political will and capacity to address human trafficking.[3]

Organization

The trafficking of women in Kosovo is primarily linked to two levels of organized crime activities. The first level consists of informal networks that traditionally exist in the form of small groups operating within families and ethnic communities. Strong family ties and 'codes of silence' make it difficult for

law enforcement authorities to gather intelligence information on their activities.

The second level is comprised of formal organized crime syndicates that control each aspect of trafficking from recruitment and transportation to the management of the premises where exploitation takes place. These larger-scale crime groups are linked to other organized criminals throughout Southeast and Eastern Europe. Using efficient lines of interaction and communication, they have developed areas of responsibility and mutual cooperation. As human trafficking is a transnational business, these clandestine criminal groups are tightly structured, typically along clan or family lines, and are hard to infiltrate, enduring, and usually involved in other forms of organized crime.[4]

Amnesty International Report on Trafficking in Minors

According to a widely reported 2004 Amnesty International report on Kosovo trafficking, girls as young as 11 from eastern European countries are being sold into sex slavery. This report is based on interviews with women and girls who have been trafficked from countries such as Moldova, Bulgaria and the Ukraine to service Kosovo's sex industry. They are said to have been moved illegally across borders and sold in "trading houses," where they are sometimes drugged and "broken in" before being sold from one trafficker to another for prices ranging from 50 to 3,500 euros (\$60 - 4,200).[5]

The 2004 Amnesty International report also asserts that the presence of peacekeepers in Kosovo is fuelling the sexual exploitation of women and encouraging trafficking. Following the deployment of 40,000 KFOR troops and hundreds of UNMIK personnel to Kosovo in 1999, a "small-scale local market for prostitution was transformed into a large-scale industry based on trafficking run by organized criminal networks." UN and NATO troops in Kosovo are utilizing trafficked women and girls for sex, with some troops involved in trafficking itself. The report observes that while international personnel comprise only 2% of Kosovo's population, these forces make up about 20% of the people using trafficked women and girls.

The Amnesty International report points out that in 2003, 10 UNMIK police officers had been dismissed or repatriated in connection with allegations related to trafficking. Since then, 22-27 KFOR troops have been dismissed for offences relating to human trafficking. A subsequent Amnesty International Report in 2006 noted that a senior member of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was convicted and sentenced for sexual exploitation of minors under 16 years.[6]

It is important to note that KFOR troops and UN personnel are immune from prosecution in Kosovo. These UN and KFOR personnel who have been dismissed for human trafficking offences have escaped criminal proceedings in their home countries.[7]

Conclusion

Kosovo's problems with human trafficking continue to worsen, with victims transiting the region from neighboring European countries as well as originating within Kosovo itself. As a troubled and politically unstable region, human traffickers continue to exploit Kosovo as the path of least resistance. Without political will, strong governmental institutions, and the rule of law, Kosovo will only see a continued increase to this tragic – and avoidable – humanitarian crisis.

[1] U.S. State Department Trafficking In Persons Report, June 2006.

[2] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) article "Reintegrating Kosovo's domestic human trafficking victims," July 19, 2005.

[3] UNMIK White Paper: Combating Human Trafficking In Kosovo – Strategy and Commitment, May 2004.

[4] UNMIK White Paper: Combating Human Trafficking In Kosovo – Strategy and Commitment, May 2004.

[5] BBC News article "Kosovo UN troops fuel sex trade," May 5, 2004.

[6] Amnesty International Annual Report 2006: Serbia and Montenegro (Including Kosovo).

[7] Amnesty International Report "So Does It Mean That We Have Rights?" May 2006.

Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation and dissemination of information on behalf of the Government of Serbia. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

12/1/2006

Balkan Update

From: Balkan Update [balkanupdate@balkanupdate.net]

Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2006 4:22 PM

Subject: Balkan Update: A New Constitution for Serbia

Balkan Update: A New Constitution for Serbia

On September 30, 2006, the 242 members of the Serbian Parliament voted unanimously for a new Serbian constitution. On October 28-29, the Serbian people will vote to ratify this new constitution in a national referendum. The constitution and referendum signal major steps in Serbia's democratic transition away from the Milosevic era and toward the European Union. The new constitution follows six years of deliberate and spirited debate by political parties, legal experts, and the NGO community. The constitution is supported by the largest national minority parties in Serbia, including the List for Sandzak (Bosnjak coalition) and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians. As Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica told the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts on October 10, "[The constitution] includes all democratic institutions and all rights according to the highest European standards."

The constitution is especially noteworthy in the following five areas:

- **Democratic Institutions.** The new constitution defines Serbia as an independent democratic state for the first time since the breakup of Yugoslavia. It provides for the direct election of both the 250 member National Assembly and the Serbian president. Article 141 of the constitution also stipulates civilian control of the Serbian armed forces.
- **Independent Judiciary.** The new Serbian constitution enshrines a free and independent judiciary to assure and enforce the rule of law in Serbia. For example, Article 3 mandates that the rule of law be exercised in Serbia through "free and direct elections, separation of powers, and an independent judiciary."

Article 142 also asserts the independence of the judicial branch and commitment to international laws and standards, stating that "Courts shall be separated and independent in their work, and they shall perform their duties in accordance with the Constitution, and generally accepted rules of international law and ratified international contracts."

- **Human Rights.** Serbia's new constitution meets the highest international standards for human rights. Article 18 of the constitution assures that human rights in Serbia are "guaranteed by the generally accepted rules of international law, ratified international treaties and laws." The Constitution also contains 60 provisions pertaining to freedom of assembly, religious freedom, press freedom, universal suffrage and gender equality.
- **Minority Rights.** Serbia possesses the largest number of national minorities in the Balkans, and the new Constitution includes specific provisions for the protection and enforcement of minority rights. For example, Article 138 of the constitution creates a Civic Defender's office to "protect citizens' rights and monitor the work of public administration bodies."

The constitution further contains two articles of importance concerning minority rights, with Article 76 prohibiting "any discrimination on the grounds of affiliation to a national minority," and Article 78 protecting the structure of multiethnic communities from being altered in order to cause a decrease in the size of an ethnic minority population.

- **Free Market Entrepreneurship.** Article 82 of the constitution establishes an economic system in

Serbia “based on the market economy, open and free markets, freedom of entrepreneurship, independence of business entities, and equality of private and other types of assets.” Article 85 provides an open environment for foreign investment in Serbia, allowing foreign nationals and corporations to own real estate and obtain concession rights for Serbian natural resources.

Conclusion

The Republic of Serbia’s new constitution and referendum are milestones for democracy in Serbia and throughout the Balkans. The constitution makes no compromises and cuts no corners in adhering to the highest standards and tradition of European democracy. The new Serbian constitution, with its respect for democratic institutions, international law, human rights, and free market entrepreneurship, defines Serbia as a modern, democratic state prepared to join the European Union.


Note: Barbour Griffith & Rogers, LLC has filed registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with regard to its representation and dissemination of information on behalf of the Government of Serbia. Additional information is on file with the Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the Department of Justice in Washington DC.

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
THE NEW SERBIA



Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica votes in the October 28-29 referendum on the Constitution, a sign of Serbia's commitment to the highest standards of democracy and human rights in Europe. Serbia is holding parliamentary elections on January 21, 2007, leading to the formation of a new democratically elected government.



Stability in the Balkans is directly linked to Serbia's democratic future.



The Serbian Orthodox Church, which has been autonomous since 1219, has played an important role in the development and preservation of Serbia's national identity. Serbia is the most ethnically diverse country in the Balkans.



The United States is the largest foreign investor in Serbia—over \$1 billion since 2002. US Steel's investment in Serbia is more than \$250 million and growing. Last year Serbia's GDP grew by 6.3%.

In the last six years, Serbia has undergone a remarkable and historic transition from dictatorship to democracy. Just last month, the Serbian people voted on a new Constitution, which assures all human rights guaranteed by international law, including:

- 60 provisions related to freedom of assembly • Religious freedom • Press freedom • Universal suffrage and gender equality

Serbian democracy is a high-gain, low-risk investment for U.S. national security and economic interests in the Balkans. Serbia supports a negotiated solution regarding Kosovo's future status, and is a full and active participant in UN-sponsored discussions regarding Kosovo with the Kosovar Albanians, the United States, Russia, and our European allies. But an imposed rather than negotiated solution would be a setback for democracy and stability in the Balkans. A decision on Kosovo's final status should be taken with care, not with haste.

Today we are building a new Serbia, a country not only rich in tradition but also an inspiration to all of the Balkans.

THE NEW SERBIA AN INVESTMENT IN DEMOCRACY THAT'S WORKING.

For further information, please visit www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/?change_lang=en or www.serbiacmbusa.org

PAID FOR BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SERBIA

Question 14(a) – Receipts-Monies:

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
November 30, 2006	Serbia	Fees & Expenses	\$599,620.41
November 30, 2006	Republic of China (Taiwan)	Fees & Expenses	\$737,591.56
November 30, 2006	Republic of India, Embassy	Fees & Expenses	\$349,998.00
November 30, 2006	State of Qatar, Embassy	Fees & Expenses	\$152,950.11
November 30, 2006	Embassy of State of Eritrea	Fees & Expenses	\$65,657.15
November 30, 2006	National Dialogue Party of Lebanon	Fees & Expenses	\$152,942.60
November 30, 2006	Kurdistan Democratic Party	Fees & Expenses	\$321,853.55
<i>Total:</i>			<i>\$2,380,613.38</i>

Question 15(a) – Disbursements-Monies:

The nature of services provided by registrant (consulting and lobbying) do not require disbursements of monies to or on behalf of foreign principals named in items 7, 8, and 9.

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COMMISSION REGISTRATION UNIT

[illegible]

Barbour Griffith & Rogers LLC

Jennifer Larkin-Lukawski

Committee/PAC

Bryan Cunningham

Committee/PAC

Jon Porter for Congress
NRSC
Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
Straight Talk America
Allen Victory Committee

9/12/2006	\$ 1,000
7/28/2006	\$ 50
9/15/2006	\$ 250
9/22/2006	\$ 250
7/11/2006	\$ 250
7/19/2006	\$ 500
9/12/2006	\$ 500
7/28/2006	\$ 500
11/14/2006	\$ 250

Friends of Conrad Burns
Dewine for US Senate
Ensign for Senate
Ensign for Senate
Tom Kean for US Senate
Gordon Smith for US Senate
Team Sununu
Team Sununu
Friends of Tim Hugo

Shalla Ross

Date	Amount
8/22/2006	\$ 500
9/12/2006	\$ 250
6/5/2006	\$ 500
9/15/2006	\$ 1,000
10/6/2006	\$ 1,000
8/22/2006	\$ 500
8/3/2006	\$ 1,000
9/25/2006	\$ 1,000
6/26/2006	\$ 2,100
9/6/2006	\$ 500
9/21/2006	\$ 500
9/18/2006	\$ 200

Committee/PAC

Chocola for Congress
Davis for Congress
Jon Porter for Congress
Pryce for Congress Committee
Reynolds for Congress
Friends of Clay Shaw
NRCC
NRSC
Eric Cantor Leadership PAC
Dewine for US Senate
Martinez for US Senate
Bryson for Governor

Robert Blackwill

Date	Amount
8/2/2006	\$ 1,000
8/2/2006	\$ 1,000
8/2/2006	\$ 1,000
8/2/2006	\$ 1,000
8/2/2006	\$ 1,000
7/19/2006	\$ 1,000
9/26/2006	\$ 111
10/13/2006	\$ 359
11/15/2006	\$ 278
10/19/2006	\$ 222

Committee/PAC

Chocola for Congress
Davis for Congress
Jim Gerlach for Congress
Friends of Clay Shaw
Friends of Mike Sodrel
Team Sununu
Bob Beauprez for Governor
Bryson for Governor
Mitch for Governor Campaign
Committee
Texans for Rick Perry

Andrew Parasiliti

Date	Amount
7/12/2006	\$ 500
9/12/2006	\$ 500
6/12/2006	\$ 500
9/26/2006	\$ 500
6/20/2006	\$ 1,000
9/27/2006	\$ 500
7/18/2006	\$ 1,000
8/8/2006	\$ 500

Committee/PAC

Friends of John Boehner
Davis for Congress
Jon Porter for Congress
NRSC (Federal)
Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
Dewine for US Senate
Nebraska Families for Pete Ricketts
Team Sununu

Dan Murphy

Date	Amount
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Committee/PAC

6/27/2006	\$	500
6/20/2006	\$	500
8/31/2006	\$	500
9/25/2006	\$	2,500
6/16/2006	\$	3,000
6/20/2006	\$	500
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6/27/2006	\$	250
6/7/2006	\$	1,000
9/20/2006	\$	1,000
6/14/2006	\$	500
9/26/2006	\$	111
10/13/2006	\$	359
9/20/2006	\$	250
11/15/2006	\$	278
12/6/2006	\$	375
10/19/2006	\$	222

Loren Monroe

Date	Amount
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9/25/2006	\$ 2,500
10/18/2006	\$ 1,000
6/21/2006	\$ 3,000
6/23/2006	\$ 1,000
7/19/2006	\$ 2,000
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9/26/2006	\$ 1,000
6/1/2006	\$ 1,000
9/25/2006	\$ 1,000
10/13/2006	\$ 360
11/15/2006	\$ 278
12/6/2006	\$ 375
10/19/2006	\$ 222

Brant Imperatore

Date	Amount
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7/28/2006	\$ 250
7/26/2006	\$ 250
9/12/2006	\$ 250
6/21/2006	\$ 500
9/12/2006	\$ 250

Friends of Jeb Hensarling
 Keller for Congress
 Friends of Clay Shaw
 NRSC
 Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
 House Conservatives Fund
 Freedom & Democracy Fund
 Majority in Congress Fund
 Defend America PAC
 Martinez for Senate
 Barbour for Governor
 Bob Beauprez for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Mitch for Governor Campaign
 Committee
 Friends of Bobby Jindal
 Texans for Rick Perry

Committee/PAC

Heather Wilson for Congress
 NRSC
 Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
 Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
 Keep Our Majority PAC
 The Bluegrass Committee
 Barbour for Governor
 Bob Beauprez for Governor
 Kenneth Blackwell for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Mitch for Governor Campaign
 Committee
 Friends of Bobby Jindal
 Texans for Rick Perry

Committee/PAC

Bachmann for Congress
 Baker for Congress
 Baker for Congress
 Barrett for Congress
 Gus Bilirakis for Congress
 Blasdel for Congress
 Friends of John Boehner
 Brown-Waite for Congress
 Shelley Moore Capito for Congress
 Chabot for Congress
 Thelma Drake for Congress
 Gard for Congress
 Gard for Congress

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10/13/2006	\$	359
11/15/2006	\$	278
12/6/2006	\$	375
6/12/2006	\$	500
10/19/2006	\$	222

Ed Rogers

Date	Amount
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8/18/2006	\$ 1,000
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8/18/2006	\$ 2,500
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9/20/2006	\$ 1,000
7/25/2006	\$ 1,000
7/24/2006	\$ 500
9/26/2006	\$ 111
10/13/2006	\$ 360
11/15/2006	\$ 278
12/6/2006	\$ 275
10/19/2006	\$ 223
9/22/2006	\$ 5,000

Scott Garrett for Congress
 JD Hayworth For Congress
 Ray Meier for Congress
 Musgrave for Congress
 Joy Padgett for Congress
 Joh Porter for Congress
 Martha Rainville for Congress
 Reichart for Congress
 Mike Rogers for Congress - MI
 Roskam for Congress
 Friends of Don Sherwood
 Simmons for Congress
 Friends of Mike Sodrel
 Sweeney for Congress
 Friends of Dave Weldon
 Weller for Congress
 Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
 PETE PAC
 PETE PAC
 Defend America PAC
 Bob Corker for US Senate
 Bob Beauprez for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Mitch for Governor Campaign
 Committee
 Friends of Bobby Jindal
 Virginians for Jerry Kilgore
 Texans for Rick Perry

Committee/PAC

Friends of John Boehner
 Chocola for Congress
 Jim Gerlach for Congress
 Friends of Clay Shaw
 NRSC
 NRSC
 Barbour Griffith & Rogers PAC
 Mark Kennedy 06
 Martinez for Senate
 Troy King for Attorney General
 Tony Williams for DC City Council
 Bob Beauprez for Governor
 Bryson for Governor
 Mitch for Governor Campaign
 Committee
 Friends of Bobby Jindal
 Texans for Rick Perry
 Alabamians for Luther Strange

Lanny Griffith

Date	Amount
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7/24/2006	\$ 500
9/26/2006	\$ 112
9/14/2006	\$ 5,000
9/20/2006	\$ 500
11/15/2006	\$ 278
12/6/2006	\$ 375
10/19/2006	\$ 223

Committee/PAC

Friends of John Boehner
Cantor for Congress
Davis for Congress
Friends of Mike Sodrel
NRSC (Federal)
NRSC (Federal)
NRSC (Federal)
COLE PAC
Ed Bryant for US Senate
Tom Kean for US Senate
Nebraska Families for Pete Ricketts
Tony Williams for DC City Council
Bob Beauprez for Governor
Bryson for Governor
Charlie Crist for Governor
Mitch for Governor Campaign
Committee
Friends of Bobby Jindal
Texans for Rick Perry

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